Intending, foreseeing, and the doctrine of a double effect by Bumpus, Ann
Intending, Foreseeing and the Doctrine of Double Effect
by
Ann Bumpus
Submitted to the Department of Linguistics and
Philosophy in Partial Fulfillment of the





Massachusetts Institute of Technology
February 1995
( 1995 Ann Bumpus
The author hereby grants to M.IT. permission to reproduce and to
distribute publicly paper and electronic copies of this thesis
document in whole or in part.
Signature of Author ,.












INTENDING, FORESEEING AND THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE EFFECT
by
ANN BUMPUS
Submitted to the Department of Linguistics and Philosophy on December 9,
1994 in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor of
Philosophy in Philosophy
ABSTRACT
We typically assume that there is a difference between foreseeing an effect of
one's voluntary action and intending the effect. Call the view that there is
such a difference 'the Ordinary View'. My dissertation is a defense of the
Ordinary View against two recent challenges.
The first challenge to the Ordinary View I call "Holism", The upshot of the
holist's position is that we intend all the foreseen effects of our voluntary
actions. I begin by considering and arguing against a couple of different
versions of holism.
The second challenge to the Ordinary View is made by Jonathan Bennett.
Bennett argues that there is no unproblematic way to mark off effects of
action which are intended as a means from effects which are merely foreseen.
His conclusion is that the notion 'intended as a means' is incoherent.
These challenges to the Ordinary View are of interest because they threaten to
undermine the Doctrine of Double Effect which claims that whether an agent
intends or merely foresees a harmful effect of action sometimes matters to the
moral permissibility of performing the action. In response to Bennett, I first
examine a view put forth by Warren Quinn. Quinn concedes to Bennett that
the distinction between intended versus merely foreseen effects faces serious
problems, but attempts to limit the ethical implications of Bennett's challenge
by offering a replacement principle for DDE which he believes is not subject to
Bennett's objection. I defend Quinn's replacement principle against certain
recent attacks in the literature, but point out that Quinn's replacement
principle really doesn't escape Bennett's objection. I then return to Bennett's
objection and argue that it rests upon two false assumptions. I conclude that
the Ordinary View withstands the two challenges.
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Consider the cases of two bombers fighting for their country:
STRATEGIC BOMBER: A strategic bomber aims to weaken the
enemy militarily by bombing a key weapon factory, He sees that
the factory cannot be destroyed without causing the deaths of
some nearby civilians. Although he would prefer not to cause
civilians deaths, he decides to go ahead and bomb.
TERROR BOMBER: A terror bomber aims to weaken the
enemy's morale by killing civilians. He targets a civilian shelter
which happens to be located near a weapon factory. He foresees
that by bombing the shelter, he will bring about the factory's
destruction as well, but he's indifferent to this latter effect, He
decides to bomb.
Assume each bomber acts on his decision to bomb. Then, under an
assumption about the individuation of actions, each of the bombers does the
same thing--each one drops a bomb and brings about the destruction of a
weapons factory and the deaths of some children. Despite this, some people
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think that what the terror bomber does is morally worse than what the
strategic bomber does. Why? People who believe the cases are morally
different may have the following in mind: the strategic bomber foresees that
by bombing he will bring about the deaths of the civilians, but he does not
intend to bring about the deaths. The terror bomber, on the other hand, does
intend to bring about the civilian deaths; this is his aim. So these people may
think it matters morally whether a person intends to bring about some harm
or merely foresees that he will do so. This view stands in opposition to
consequentialist views since it draws a moral distinction between two actions
despite the fact that the actions have exactly the same consequences.
The bomber cases are meant to be illustrative of a moral principle
according to which the strategic bomber's action is permissible and the terror
bomber's is not. The principle, called the 'Doctrine of Double Effect' is found
in Catholic theology and is usually traced back to Aquinas. Elizabeth
Anscombe brought the principle into secular philosophy in her essay War
and Murder.1 The doctrine is this:
The Doctrine of Double Effect (DDE): Where an agent, X, expects
to produce two effects by A-ing, one of them bad and the other
good, it is impermissible for X to A if she intends to bring about
the bad effect and permissible for her to A if she does not intend
to bring about the bad effect.2
1See St. Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, p.64,a.7.c, Also see GE.M. Anscombe
"War and Murder" (1981),
20n most views, what I call 'DDE' requires qualification: if the harm the agent would bring
about as a foreseen but unintended effect of A-ing is a grave enough harm, then the agent may
not proceed. The following may be such a case: the strategic bomber has a very powerful bomb
and foresees that by bombing the armory he will destroy an entire city. Although he does not
intend this result, the harm is too serious for the action to be permitted by the DDE. I ignore the
need for qualification here; it is not relevant for our purposes.
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DDE assumnes (1) that there is a difference between intending to bring
about an effect and foreseeing you will do so and (2) that it is morally worse to
cause harm which you intend than it is to cause harm which you foresee,
In this chapter and the next, I will not be concerned with the second claim, or
with any other moral claim. Rather I will be interested in the first claim,
which I will call 'the Ordinary View'.
The Ordinary View: There is a difference between intending to
bring about some effect by A-ing and merely foreseeing that by
A-ing you will bring about the effect.
Take a very common sort of occurrence. You are tired but you want to
get some work done. You decide to drink some coffee, knowing that coffee
makes you jumpy but also makes you more alert. Ordinarily we would say
that you intend to drink the coffee and that you intend to bring about your
increased alertness but you do not intend to bring about the jumpiness. We
sometimes make this distinction by calling what is unintended but foreseen a
"side effect", so in this case, we would say you bring about jumpiness as a side
effect of drinking the coffee; it is not an effect you intend to bring about. If
some foreseen effects of action are side-effects, then the Ordinary View is true.
On the other hand, if an agent intends to bring about all the effects she
foresees, then DDE is empty. As plausible as the Ordinary View seems, it has
come under attack and I am interested in whether or not it can be defended.
In this chapter, I will present and argue against two positions which challenge
the Ordinary View: Broad Holism and Deliberative Holism.
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2. Broad Holism
In describing the bomber cases, I said that each bomber decides to bomb.
Someone who holds a holistic view of decision-making would argue that the
bomber does not decide simply to bomb; rather the bomber decides on
something broader, he decides on a scenario. A holist about decisions would
point out that each bomber deliberates over whether to destroy the munitions
factory and kill the civilians, and so on. The holist would then argue that
when the bomber reaches a decision, he decides on one of these broader
packages.
A simple analogy may help to make this holist's point more plausible.
Imagine yourself at the market trying to decide between the Lean Cuisine
Chicken Burrito Dinner and the shrink-wrapped New England Boiled
Dinner. Both are, of course, extremely tempting. In the end your love of
cabbage prevails and so you choose... well, what do you choose? It seems most
accurate to say you choose the New Englernd Boiled Dinner, not simply the
cabbage. You choose this dinner because it contains the cabbage, but still you
choose the whole package over the Burrito package.
The holist is making a similar point about decisions to act. The strategic
bomber does not simply decide to destroy the armory. Rather he decides on a
whole package; the package includes destroying the armory but it also
includes bringing about civilian deaths. I will call these packages which agents
allegedly decide upon 'scenarios'. I will take scenarios to consist only of
actions. The strategic bomber might be said to compare a scenario which
includes destroying the armory and killing the civilians and weakening the
enemy to a second scenario which includes his returning to the base (without
having bombed) and explaining to a commanding officer why he did not go
through with the raid. In discussing scenarios, I will often simplify in the
12
following two ways. First, though I do not always make this explicit, I assume
that the bomber is considering his killing the civilians, etc. So if each of two
agents, X and Y, are considering whether to A and to B, they are not thereby
considering the same scenario. X is considering a scenario which includes X's
A-ing and X's B-ing while Y is considering a scenario which includes Y's A-
ing and Y's B-ing.
Second, I will often refer to the scenario in which an agent A's (the
scenario which includes the strategic bomber's bombing for example). More
realistically, the strategic bomber might be said to be considering many
scenarios which include his bombing. He might, for example, be uncertain
about how the world will be if he bombs. Perhaps he is uncertain about
whether a nearby church will be destroyed as well. In this case, he may
consider two scenarios, one in which he bombs but does not destroy the
church and another in which he bombs and does destroy the church. (Then
presumably he would make some assignment of probabilities to these
different scenarios.) I am going to ignore such complications.
A further question arises about the breadth of scenarios. For example,
does a scenario in which an agent A's include her bringing about all foreseen
effects of A-ing? Here there will be a certain looseness in how I use the term
'scenario'. I want it to stand in for whatever these packages are which holists
claim people deliberate over and decide upon. But I will be presenting two
different views of holism, and these views will differ on how broad these
packages are, thus on one view (Broad Holism), scenarios will be broader than
on the other view (Deliberative Holism). The Broad Holist's point about
decisions may be summarized as follows:
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Broad Holistic Decision Principle: If X foresees that A-ing will
result in e and decides to A, then she decides on a scenario
which includes A-ing and bringing about e,
Notice that on this view, an agent who decides to A, decides on a
scenario which includes not only her A-ing but her bringing about all
foreseen consequences of A-ing. This is the broad holistic view of decisions;
we don't simply decide to A, but decide on these broader packages (just as we
decide not only on the cabbage, but on the whole dinner),
So far we have been looking at a claim about decisions. How does all
this bear on intentions? The following principle expresses a very plausible
view about the relation between deciding and intending,
Decision Intention Principle for Actions: If X decides to A,
then X intends to A.
This view suggests a very close link between decisions and intentions.
The holist accepts this link between decisions and intentions, but argues that
just as one decides on scenarios, so one intends scenarios. According to Broad
Holism, the holistic nature of decisions carries over, or transfers, to
intentions. So the holist supports the following:
Decision Intention Principle for Scenarios: If X decides in favor
of a scenario, then X intends that scenario,
I have been assuming so far that only that actions are intended. Now
we have a proposal which assumes scenarios are intended. But perhaps this is
not a problem. After all, scenarios just are collections of actions, So perhaps
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we can understand 'X intends S' where S is a scenario consisting of X's A-ing
and B-ing as 'X intends to A and B'.
The Holistic Decision Principle and the Decision Intention Principle for
Scenarios (henceforth 'the Decision Intention Principle') together present the
beginning of a threat to the DDE. The DDE proponent asserts that the strategic
bomber does not intend to bring about the civilian deaths. The Holistic
Decision Principle and the Decision Intention Principle together tell us that
even the strategic bomber intends a scenario which includes bringing about
civilian deaths. This of course leaves open whether the bomber intends to
bring about the deaths themselves (as opposed to simply intending the
scenario which includes the deaths). These two principles are compatible with
the claim that X intends a scenario but does not intend any one part of the
scenario and with the claim that she intends some parts but not others, thus
they are compatible with the claim that the terror bomber intends to bring
about civilian deaths and the strategic bomber does not intend to bring about
the deaths. The DDE proponent could agree to the Holistic Decision Principle
and the Decision Intention Principle. She could allow that bringing about e be
part of an intended scenario without itself being intended.3 For example, so
far the holist, if right, has shown only that the strategic bomber intends a
scenario which includes his bringing about civilian deaths,and this differs
from his intending to bring about the deaths themselves. So the DDE
proponent could claim that there is a moral distinction between intending to
bring about e and intending a scenario which has as a part your bringing
about e.
3Roderick Chisholm appears to accept this view, or one much like it. Chisholm (1970).
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Those who hold the position I am calling "Broad Holism" reject this
option. They accept the Holistic Decision Principle and the Decision Intention
Principle but object to the proposal above. Rather they endorse the following:
Intention Division Principle: If X intends scenario S and S
includes X's bringing about e, then X intends to bring about e.
According to the Intention Division Principle, if the bomber intends a
scenario which includes his bringing about the civilian deaths, then he
intends to bring about the deaths, Thus the three principles above (the
Holistic Decision Principle, the Decision Intention Principle, and the
Intention Division Principle), entail that both bombers intend to bring about
the civilian deaths.
Broad Holism then is the view which favors these three principles:4
Broad Holistic Decision Principle: If X foresees that A-ing will
result in e and decides to A, then she decides on a scenario
which includes A-ing and bringing about e.
Decision Intention Principle for Scenarios: If X decides on a
scenario, then X intends that scenario.
Intention Division Principle: If X intends scenario S and S
includes X's bringing about e, then X intends to bring about e.
4 See also Michael Bratman's discussion of the problem of the package deal in chapter 10 of
Intentions. Plans. and Practical Reason. He presents the holistic view as an explicitly
normative one; otherwise my presentation differs from his in fairly minor ways.
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Broad Holism is incompatible with the Ordinary View. According to
Broad Holism, an agent intends to bring about each effect of her voluntary
action which she foresees. Thus, there is no difference between those effects
an agent expects to bring about and those she intends to bring about. But that
is to say that the Ordinary View is false. Since DDE depends upon the
Ordinary View, Broad Holism presents a challenge to DDE.
In the next section, I will turn to a couple of cases in which Broad
Holism yields a very counterintuitive result,
3. Two Objections to Broad Holism
The first case involves trivial effects. Ralph deliberates over whether to
move from New York to San Francisco, He foresees that if he moves to San
Francisco, he will need to find a new tailor, (He has no desire to bring his
tailor with him.) Ralph's relationship with his tailor is quite mundane and
his searching for a new one is an utterly trivial aspect of his moving to the
West Coast. Nevertheless, it is a consequence he foresees. Thus, according to
Broad Holism, if Ralph decides on the scenario in which he moves to San
Francisco, Ralph intends to bring it about that he need a new tailor. But this is
counterinuitive. Ralph is concerned with where he will live in San Francisco,
how relocating will affect his friendships, what his new job will be like, how
he will sell his condo in New York, and so on, The fact about his tailor plays
no role in his deliberations; it does not influence his decision in any way. It is
counterintuitive to think that he intends to bring about a need for a new
tailor.
If this example is not entirely convincing, consider some other
examples, If Broad Holism is true, then we are faced with the
counterintuitive result that the agent who sets out on a walk across a field,
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foreseeing that she will bend blades of grass, intends to do so. And the person
who goes for a bike ride, foreseeing that by doing so he will burn calories,
intends to do so, 5 But surely this need not be the case,
A second sort of case poses even more serious problems for the Broad
Holist. Consider an administrator who is responsible for hiring someone to
fill a job opening. She believes it is her duty to hire the applicant with the best
qualifications. She learns that one of her neighbors is applying for the job and
foresees that her hiring decision will affect her relationship with her neighbor
in the following way: if she gives the neighbor the job, their relationship will
improve. If she gives the job to someone else, their relationship will suffer.
The administrator does not want her relationship with her neighbor to suffer
but believes that she must fulfill her duty to hire the best candidate. Wanting
to be fair, she decides to screen-off (or exclude) all considerations about how
the hiring decision will affect the relationship from her deliberations. 6
If the administrator decides on the scenario in which she hires her
neighbor, then according to Broad Holism, in spite of her 'screening off'
efforts--she still intends to bring about an improved relationship with the
neighbor. Here then is another counterintuitive result of Broad Holism.
Intuitively it seems she does not intend to bring this result about. If someone
comes to her and accuses her of being biased in her hiring choice, she might
honestly respond: "My intention was to hire the best person for the job, not to
benefit myself or my neighbor in any way." This case suggests that people do
not intend parts of a scenario which they screen-off from their deliberations.
These two cases are meant to undercut the intuitive plausibility of
Broad Holism. But a more plausible version of Holism can be formulated by
5Michael Bratman "Two Faces of Intention", (1984), p. 395,
6Alison McIntyre discusses such case (MS, 1987). The expression "screening off" is hers,
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rejecting the Broad Holistic Decision Principle and replacing it with
something else. So I will no longer consider the Broad Holistic Decision
Principle, but will now turn to the second form of holism,
4. Deliberative Holism
The view I call "Deliberative Holism" differs in only one way from
Broad Holism. The Deliberative Holist accepts the Intention Division
Principle and the Decision Intention Principle, but replaces the Broad Holistic
Decision Principle with what I will call the "Deliberative Holistic Decision
Principle". Thus Deliberative Holism is the view which accepts these
principles;
Deliberative Holistic Decision Principle: If X believes that e is an
upshot of A-ing and assigns weight to that fact in her
deliberations, then she decides to A if and only if she decides on a
scenario which includes A-ing and bringing about e,
Decision Intention Principle for Scenarios: If X decides on a
scenario, then X intends that scenario.
Intention Division Principle: If X intends scenario S and S
includes X's bringing about e, then X intends to bring about e,
Let's look more closely at the Deliberative Holistic Decision Principle.
What does it mean for an agent to assign weight to the fact that an effect wrill
be brought about? Well, let's reconsider the hiring case discussed above. The
administrator is aware of the following: (i) if she hires her neighbor, she
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herself will have to do more of the computer work; and (ii) if she hires her
neighbor, her relationship with her neighbor will improve. She allows (i) to
bear on her decision about what to do, Since she does not want to do more
computer work herself, this fact counts as a cost of hiring her neighbor; that
is, she assigns it negative value. In contrast, she does not allow (ii) to enter
her deliberations about what to do; she does not count it as a cost or benefit of
hiring her neighbor. So assigning weight to the fact that a foreseen
consequence will occur if one A's involves seeing this fact as a cost or benefit
of A-ing and deciding to allow the cost or benefit to bear on the decision of
whether to A. 7
So far, Deliberative Holism may seem like an ad hoc response to the
objections raised against Broad Holism. But I think the view is not ad hoc.
Rather, the view emphasizes the link between intentions and deliberation. It
would not be surprising if what one brings about intentionally is closely tied
to what one brings about deliberately (in fact, it might be surprising if there
were a difference between these), nor would it be surprising if what one
brings about deliberately is closely tied to what enters into one's deliberations.
The Deliberative Holist says we intend to bring about those effects to which
we assign weight in our deliberations. The strategic bomber gives the deaths a
negative value; he sees them as weighing against dropping the bomb.
Screened off effects and trivial effects of acting play no role in an agent's
deliberations and thus are not brought about deliberately.
7 McIntyre writes that the consequences the agent intends are the ones which are for the
agent a reason for or against going ahead with the plan. She writes: "A reason against a plan is
not merely some cost or consequence which would tend to decrease the plan's attractiveness. It
must be a consideration which counts to the agent as a reason against adopting or going ahead
with the plan in question. Some costs are too small to be seen as a reason against a plan..." (p.
28). I will assume that costs which are to small to count as a reason simply are not given weight
in the deliberative process. I will treat costs which Mclntyre calls too small as trivial
consequences (ie ones which are assigned no weight by the agent).
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Unlike Broad Holism, Deliberative Holism is compatible with the
Ordinary View (p, 5). According to the Deliberative Holist, an agent may
foresee but not intend to bring about trivial consequences and screened off
consequences. If Deliberative Holism does not pose a challenge to the
Ordinary View, why are we concerned with it? In the following section, I
discuss why a proponent of DDE would be unhappy with Deliberative
Holism,
5. Deliberative Holism and DDE
While Deliberative Holism does allow for a distinction between what
an agent intends to bring about and what she merely foresees she will bring
about, it does not allow for the distinction needed by DDE. For example, the
DDE proponent typically assumes that the pilot in STRATEGIC BOMBER
foresees he will cause deaths without intending to do so. But according to
Deliberative Holism, since the strategic bomber assigns weight to the deaths, it
will turn out that he (like the terror bomber) intends to bring the deaths
about. So if Deliberative Holism is true, DDE will no longer draw a moral
distinction between STRATEGIC BOMBER and TERROR BOMBER.
There will be other results which are problematic for DDE. Imagine a
third bomber, the callous bomber. The callous bomber is in much the same
situation as the strategic bomber. He wants to weaken the enemy by causing
the destruction of the factory and he foresees that by bombing he will cause
civilian deaths as well as the destruction of the factory. The strategic and
callous bomber differ in this way: the strategic bomber sees the civilian deaths
as a cost of bombing while the callous bomber does not. The callous bomber
assigns no value to the deaths; he is completely indifferent to this expected
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effect of bombing. According to Deliberative Holism, the strategic bomber
intends to bring about civilian deaths while the callous bomber does not.
Furthermore, according to DDE, the strategic bomber, who worries
about the deaths, may not drop his bomb, but the callous bomber, who does
not care about the deaths, may permissibly drop his bomb. This surely cannot
be right.
I offer this case not as an argument against Deliberative Holism, since
the Deliberative Holist may simply say of it:" So much the worse for the
Doctrine of Double Effect. " Rather the case is meant to show that Deliberative
Holism, if true, diminishes the plausibility of DDE and thus to show why a
proponent of DDE would be motivated to argue against Deliberative Holism.
6. Objection to Deliberative Holism
Although Deliberative Holism does not yield counterintuitive results
where trivial effects and screened off effects are concerned, it will yield
counterintuitive results in other cases. To see the problem, we should look at
a case which does not bring in DDE, Consider the case of Frieda. Frieda is a
surgeon. While she is on duty in the emergency room, a very ill patient is
brought in. If Frieda does nothing, the patient will die. If Frieda operates,
there will be the following two results: the patient will live and the patient
will be paralyzed. For Frieda, bringing about the paralysis weighs strongly
against operating. Still, saving the patient's life weighs more strongly on
operating, so she decides to operate.
According to the Deliberative Holist, Frieda intends to bring about the
patient's paralysis. After all, Frieda assigns negative value to this foreseen
effect of operating; it is a reason against operating. But surely she does not
intend to bring about this effect.
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The Deliberative Holist would presumably acknowledge the
counterintuitiveness of the claim that Frieda intends to bring about the
patient's paralysis. It is not at all surprising that such cases can be generated
given that the Deliberative Holist holds that an agent may intend to bring
about even those effects she sees as costs of acting. The Deliberative Holist
could stress that although bringing about the paralysis is a cost of acting for
Frieda rather than something she aims at, it is a cost which Frieda
acknowledges and takes responsibility for bringing about. Alison McIntyre
defends Deliberative Holism. She claims that reasons against acting are "costs
of acting which the agent acknowledges and so takes a certain kind of
responsibility for, in acting." 8
My view is that an account of intention which entails that Frieda
intends to bring about paralysis should be rejected. An account of intention
which strays too far from our ordinary understanding will not help the holist;
it will simply leave room for the DDE proponent to argue that the morally
important distinction is between intending in the ordinary sense rather in
this new, broader sense and merely foreseeing harmful consequences. The
question then is which of the three principles constitutive of Deliberative
Holism should be rejected.
7. Rejecting the Holistic Challenge
A proponent of the Ordinary View will of course want to reject at least
one of the three principles. To review, those principles are:
23
8 McIntyre, p. 28.
Deliberative Holistic Decision Principle: If X believes that e is an
upshot of A-ing and assigns weight to that fact in her
deliberations, then she decides to A if and only if she decides on
a scenario which includes A-ing and bringing about e.
Decision Intention Principle for Scenarios: If X decides on a
scenario, then X intends that scenario.
Intention Division Principle: If X intends scenario S and S
includes X's bringing about e, then X intends to bring about e.
I'll begin by discussing the Intention Division Principle. Why think
that if X intends a scenario, she intends each part of the scenario as well? If an
agent intends scenario S, then either she intends no parts of S, she intends
some parts of S and not others, or she intends all parts of S. No one wants to
claim that she intends no parts of the scenario. This would entail that an
agent does not intend to bring about e even where doing so is her end or a
means to her end.
But what about the view that she intends some parts and not others? If
we grant the holistic nature of decisions, then to preserve commonsense
distinctions, we might reject the Intention Division Principle and maintain
that only some parts of a scenario are intended. I want to consider a couple of
the most obvious proposals for making this distinction between parts of the
scenario which are intended and parts which are not.
First Proposal: If X has decided on a scenario which includes bringing
about e, then X intends to bring about e if and only if she wants to bring about
e, This proposal locates the difference between intending and merely
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foreseeing in desire. I think though that wanting to bring about e is neither
necessary, nor sufficient for intending to bring about e. Let's consider
necessary condition first.
We can imagine that the terror bomber does not want to bring about
any deaths. Perhaps he hates harming others and if you ask him later, 'Did
you want to cause those deaths?', he will say 'No, that was the hardest thing I
have ever had to do', Even in the absence of a desire to cause the civilian
deaths, the terror bomber intends to cause civilian deaths.
The DDE proponent might try to respond by claiming that there are
narrow and broad senses of 'want' or 'desire' (call these 'wantn ' or 'desiren'
and 'wantb' or 'desireb'). While the terror bomber does not wantn to bring
about deaths, he nevertheless wantsb to bring them about; after all he believes
the deaths will bring about his end.
But the holist has a response; the holist will point out that once we
admit some broader notion of desire, then the strategic bomber may also be
said to wantb to bring about deaths. The strategic bomber wantsb to bring about
deaths in so far as he takes doing so to be connected to his end. This response
is at first unconvincing. After all, it may be that the strategic bomber attaches
negative value to bringing about the deaths, but that he attaches enough
positive value to other elements of the scenario that the scenario as a whole
is preferable to alternatives. But notice that the same can be said of the terror
bomber. Perhaps he too attaches negative value to bringing about the deaths
but prefers the scenario which includes bringing about the deaths to other
options,
So far I have been arguing that desire fails to provide a necessary
condition for a part of a scenario being intended. I think desire also fails to
provide a sufficient condition for a foreseen effect to be intended. There seem
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to be cases where although the agent does desire a foreseen side effect, the
nonholist would want to say that the foreseen effect is unintended. The
following may be such a case:
Frederico loves to sing at night. His singing greatly irks his
neighbor and he knows it. In fact, he is quite pleased with this
upshot of his nocturnal practicing. Still, if we ask him why he
sings at night, he will tell us that his voice is most relaxed and at
its peak in the night. If we ask him whether he intends to annoy
his neighbor, he will adamantly deny that this is his intention.
He looks upon this effect as an unintended benefit of singing at
night.
One might attempt to respond to this example by claiming that
Frederico intends to practice his singing and to annoy his neighbor. Certainly,
he might intend to do both; he might sing a little louder if he's not sure he is
keeping his neighbor awake, and so on. But we need not assume he has the
intention to do both.
We have been looking for a way to distinguish parts of the scenario the
agent intends from parts he does not intend. I have been arguing that an
agent's desiring a part of a scenario does not provide a sufficient condition for
his intending that part. I have also been arguing that appeals to desire as a
necessary condition for intending don't work. I want to turn now to a second
proposal.
Second Proposal: If X has decided on a scenario which includes
bringing about e (as a result of A-ing), then she intends to bring about e if and
only if bringing about e is a means or end (and not a side-effect of A-ing). We
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often talk about side effects as unintended and means and ends as intended.
The DDE proponent might point out that although the strategic bomber
intends a scenario which includes bringing about the civilian deaths, he does
not intend to bring about the deaths themselves since he views bringing
about the deaths as a side effect of his bombing and not as a means to his end.
But this proposal will not do. Whether or not an action is a means to a
given end is irrelevant to whether the agent intends that action as a means to
the end. For example, assume the terror bomber is mistaken in believing that
civilian deaths will lead to a drop in enemy morale. In fact, civilian deaths
will not causally contribute to his end of weakening the enemy. This does not
entail that he does not intend to cause the deaths.
Still, it seems the original proposal is easily modified. What we want is
the following: If X has decided on a scenario which includes bringing about e
(as a result of A-ing), X intends to bring about e if and only if she believes that
bringing about e is a means or end (and not a side-effect of A-ing) .
Before we can evaluate the modified proposal, we need to have an
understanding of what is meant by "side effect". If by "side effect", we just
mean an effect which the agent does not intend to bring about then appeal to
side effects versus means and ends will be of no help; it will be circular. What
is needed is an account of side effects versus means which does not itself rely
upon the notion 'intending'. Giving such an account may be surprisingly
difficult. For example, one might say that the deaths are a side effect for the
strategic bomber because he does not really need to bring about deaths to
achieve his end. One might point to a counterfactual to make the point; if the
strategic bomber believed that as a result of his raid, the armory was destroyed
but amazingly, the civilians were unharmed, he would not circle back for
another attack. But Jonathan Bennett has pointed out a problem with such
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reasoning. Bennett points out that by the same sort of reasoning one can
show that the terror bomber does not really intend to kill civilians. After all,
if the terror bomber believed the civilians would miraculously recover after
the war, he would be no less motivated to bomb, So perhaps he too does not
intend to cause deaths. (This is a crude version of Bennett's argument, I
discuss Bennett's objection at much greater length in Chapters 2 and 4,)
We have been looking for a way to distinguish parts of the scenario
which are intended from parts which are not (in order to block the holist's
claim that all parts are intended) in order to reject the Intention Division
Principle. My conclusion here is not that there is no way to do so, but that
there is no obvious and unproblematic way to make the distinction, Even so,
given this weak conclusion and the fact that no one wants to claim that no
parts of the scenario are intended (surely agents intend to bring about their
ends), we need to take the Intention Division Principle seriously.
8. Bratman's Response to Deliberative Holism
In Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reasoning, Michael Bratman
considers a view very similar to Deliberative Holism. 9 He endorses a principle
similar to my Intention Division Principle. Also, Bratman endorses
something fairly close to the Deliberative Holistic Decision Principle. He
accepts the following:
If I know my A-ing will result in e and I seriously consider that
fact in my deliberations about whether to A and still go on to
conclude on A, then if I am rational my reasoning will have
9 1n Chapter 10 of Bratman (1987), Bratman discusses what he calls 'the problem of the
package deal'. He represents the problem as issuing from the acceptance of four principles,
rather than three and the principles he discusses are all normative.
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issued in a conclusion on an overall scenario that includes both
my A-ing and my bringing about e. 10
This principle differs in certain ways from my Deliberative Holistic
Decision Principle, most notably in that I have not made any qualifications
for whether or not the agent is rational, Still, since Bratman accepts this
principle, he clearly accepts some sort of holism about decisions,
Bratman rejects holism about intentions and does so by driving a
wedge between intentions and these conclusions (which he calls 'practical
conclusions' and I call 'decisions'). He accepts that practical conclusions are
holistic in nature but rejects the view that this holism transfers to intentions.
So if faced with the triad of principles above, he would reject the Decision
Intention Principle.
Why think that decisions are holistic and intentions are not?
According to Bratman, practical conclusions are subject to different sorts of
pressures than are intentions. These pressures come from concerns about
rationality. He writes that practical conclusions are holistic because they are
subject to standards of 'clearheadedness' or intellectual honesty. For example,
when Frieda deliberates about what to do, she cannot honestly and rationally
ignore the fact that operating on the patient will cause paralysis, If Frieda is
rational, her conclusion will not merely be to operate but will be in favor of
the whole package-operating, saving the patient, and bringing about the
patient's paralysis.
This is a normative view. It says it would be irrational not to take into
account all foreseen consequences of acting. My interest here is in how we
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actually make decisions, but it's highly likely that these come to the same
thing (in at least most instances).
Deciding on a scenario involves summing up all the costs and benefits.
These costs and benefits, according to Bratman, are 'backward-looking'
pressures while intentions are subject to 'forward-looking' pressure, An
agent's deliberations (should or on the view I am considering, do) reflect
what she believes to be the facts--thus, Frieda cannot rationally ignore the
paralysis when deliberating, But the connection between intentions and prior
deliberation is, according to Bratman anyway, a looser connection. Intentions
are individuated by their role in further reasoning and action--they are
future-directed. They are not subject to the same standards of 'deliberative
honesty'.
I find it difficult to grasp Bratman's meaning here. A practical
conclusion is supposed to differ from an intention in being backward, rather
than forward, looking. But practical conclusions are conclusions to do such-
and-such. A conclusion to A or to bring about e is surely forward-looking (or
at least present-directed) rather than backward-looking. So I am suspicious of
the attempt to drive a wedge between these conclusions and intentions.
Also, I find his point about deliberative honesty unconvincing, Surely
Frieda can decide simply to operate while meeting standards of rationality
and deliberative honesty. She does not ignore her belief that operating will
bring about paralysis. She takes this consequence seriously--she sees it as
weighing against operating. This is sufficient to make her reasoning
clearheaded. She does not need to include the consequence in the content of
her conclusion, or choice. We can distinguish an agent's reasons for reaching
a conclusion from the content of that conclusion.
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I find Bratman's reasons for rejecting the Decision Intention Principle
unconvincing. In the following section, I too will argue for the rejection of
this principle, but on grounds different from those offered by Bratman.
9. An Alternative Rejection of Holism
The Decision Intention Principle asserts that if an agent decides on a
scenario, that agent intends the scenario. My view is that when one decides
on something, one is reaching a theoretical conclusion; one is making an
evaluative judgment. Notice that we decide on all sorts of things, not just
collections of actions. For example, we decide on blue shirts over red cnes,
New England Boiled Dinners over Burritos, and so on. There may be reason
to treat such decisions in a uniform way. Assuming that deciding on S entails
intending S rules out a uniform treatment. After all, if you decide on the
New England Boiled Dinner, you do not intend the dinner. Deciding on the
dinner may give rise to some other intention, like an intention to buy the
dinner, but that's another matter.
My suggestion is that we distinguish deciding to from deciding on.
Deciding on may correspond to reaching a theoretical conclusion while
deciding to may correspond to reaching a practical conclusion., My view is that
if one decides to A, then one intends to A, However if one decides on
something, one does not intend that thing. This allows us to treat deciding
on something in a uniform way, whether what is decided on is a collection of
actions or a shirt. In all cases, such a decision is an evaluative judgment. Such
judgments often inform or give rise to intentions, but not always. The
Decision Intention Principle sounds plausible because scenarios include only
actions and actions are the sorts of things agents can intend. But I think we
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should see that to decide on a scenarios is still just to make a preference-
ranking; it's not yet to decide to do anything.
There is a further consideration which may support my view and
suggest that this line of response is one Bratman might have taken as well,
Bratman asserts that practical conclusions are conclusions which we decide
upon whereas theoretical conclusions are ones we discover,11 When one
ranks preferences as above, one is engaging in what Bratman would call
'desire-belief weighing'. But notice what this involves. It involves taking into
account one's desires, one's beliefs (for example, of the likelihood that a given
action will have a certain outcome) and then doing some calculations. We do
not decide what to desire anymore than we decide whether to be in pain.
What we desire, like what we feel, is something we discover. This may sound
odd, but I think the oddness is attributable to the fact that discovery typically
involves the risk of error and these cases are not ones where we go wrong.
Nevertheless, we do not decide what to desire, Likewise, we do not decide
what to believe. So the process of desire-belief weighing really falls into the
category of theoretical reasoning, if one understands theoretical conclusions
as conclusions we discover, I think all this supports my position that to decide
on a scenario is not yet to intend to do anything. 12
Let me summarize the two responses to the holistic challenge which I
have been contrasting. Bratman rejects the holistic challenge by driving a
wedge between practical conclusions and intentions. He defends this position
1 1He also says that practical conclusions are conclusions concerning what to do. So perhaps
he takes these to coincide. I think reasoning about what to do includes preferences rankings,
beliefs, and other sorts of theoretical conclusions.
12The view I am asserting here does I think face a serious problem, If desire-belief
weighing is not deciding then what is? This view may make cases of ordinary decision-making
too mysterious, (The flip side of the problem is this account may also too easily explain
weakness of will.)
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with the suggestion that practical conclusions are backward-looking and
intentions are forward-looking. I think practical conclusions (or decisions to
act) are forward-looking. I don't want to drive a wedge between these and
intentions. I do agree with Bratman that we can reject the Decision-Intention
Principle, but because I think that deciding on a scenarios is not reaching a
practical conclusions. These conclusions are not yet conclusions to do
anything. Thus while I think the following is true "If X decides to A, then X
intends to A", I think the Decision Intention Principle (for Scenarios) is false.
In this chapter I have considered and rejected two versions of holism,
each of which threatened to undermine the distinction between intending
and foreseeing which is assumed by the Doctrine of Double Effect. In part, I
have argued that deciding on a scenario may be merely evaluative and need
not usher in an intention. In the following chapter I turn to a second
challenge to the view that the terror bomber intends to bring about civilian





In the previous chapter, we saw that some of the most natural ways to
distinguish what is intended from what is merely foreseen fail. Recall that
appeals to desire to mark the difference did not succeed and I suggested that
there was a serious problem with appeals to the notions 'means' and 'side
effects' as well. In this chapter, I will be turning to that problem. But first, I
will take a brief look at two different types of accounts of intention.
2. Reductive Accounts of Intention
Elizabeth Anscombe, Donald Davidson (in his early work) and others
advocate what might be called a reductive view of intentions,. Advocates of
this sort of view tend to focus on intentional action. What makes an action
intentional is its relations to certain beliefs and desires of the agent. For
example, what makes it the case that Max intentionally cracks the egg will be
facts about the relations his egg-cracking bears to his beliefs and desires. For
example, he wants an omelette and beliefs that cracking the egg is a way of
making an omelette. Otherwise put, his desire for an omelette and his belief
that cracking the egg will help to produce an omelette give him a reason to
1The different reductive views vary from each other of course. Perhaps most notably they
differ in whether they assert a causal relation between the action and the relevant desires and
beliefs. I ignore all these differences since they are not pertinent here.
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crack the egg. Such views tend to deemphasize future directed intentions
(intending). And it is really future directed intentions which are relevant to
the Ordinary View. But some contemporary advocates of the reductive view
extend the account given of intentional action to future directed intentions.
It is common on such views to see intending as a complex of believing and
desiring (for example, Sally intends to go skiing if and only if she wants to go
skiing more than she wants to do anything incompatible with skiing and she
believes she is more likely to ski than not to ski, or as a special kind of
desire). 2
3. A (non-reductive) Planning Account of Intention
In Intentions, Plans, and Practical Reason. Michael Bratman presents a
detailed account of intentions which differs in important ways from
reductive views. While proponents of redutive views typically reach their
conclusions by considering cases of acting intentionally, Michael Bratman
arrives at his account by starting with cases of intending to do something in
the future (for example, intending to drive to Boston tomorrow). The
difference is important. Bratman takes these future-directed cases of intention
to be paradigm cases, In such cases, there is no action. For example, I may
intend to drive to Boston tomorrow, yet currently, I am sitting at my
computer typing. My intention to drive to Boston tomorrow is not
manifested in my current behavior, nor does it explain anything about my
current behavior. (Of course it might explain why I am typing this sentence
now and not tomorrow, but it need not.) These future-directed cases of
intending are problematic for redutive accounts like Anscombe's and
2This is a highly simlified version of Robert Audi's view. See Audi (1970).
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Davidson's. Even if acting intentionally is simply performing an action
which is related in a certain way to one's beliefs and desires, where does this
leave merely intending to A? (One cannot give the same explanation since
the action is missing.) Bratman argues that attempts to extend accounts of
intentional action future directed intentions fail, Rather, he thinks, we need
to recognize intentions as a distinctive state of mind, on a par with beliefs and
desires.3 I will not attempt to summarize or defend Bratman's arguments for
this conclusion here. Rather, I am interested in the resulting account of
intentions which he advocates. If intentions are to be taken seriously, on a par
with beliefs and desires, what are they?4 I devote more attention to
Bratman's planning view than to the reductive accounts. I do so because, as
will be seen shortly, Bennett relies upon an Anscombe-like view of
intentions to make his objection. It will be important to ask whether
Bennett's objection holds on other accounts of intention.
Bratman thinks that to understand intentions, we need to see them as
elements in plans. Intentions are what allow both interpersonal coordination
and intrapersonal coordination. For example, one person is able to coordinate
meeting another at the airport partly by forming an intention to be at the
airport at a certain time. This intention, once formed, has a certain sort of
stability. If a person intends to be at the airport Thursday morning, she will
not continue deliberating about what to do Thursday morning; rather, she
will see the issue as settled. Likewise, she will not make plans which she
31n later work, Donald Davidson arrives at a similar conclusion by considering future-directed
cases of intending. See 'Intending'.
4One objection to this approach might be that attitudes can be divided exhaustively according
to what Anscombe called their 'direction of fit'. Desires and desire-like states have one
direction of fit, beliefs have the other. Intentions apparently have the same direction of fit as
desires, so why not see them as a special sort of desire? Because intentions differ in an
important way from desires, There is nothing criticizable about having desires one knows to
conflict, however there is something criticizable about having intentions one knows to conflict.
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thinks conflict with her being at the airport on Thursday morning. Intentions
are to be understood in terms of the relations they bear both to an agent's
reasoning and to an agent's behavior. Bratman sees intentions as having
what he calls a 'reason-centered dimension of commitment' and a 'volition-
centered dimension of commitment'. So someone who has formed the
intention to go to Boston tomorrow will see the issue as settled. She will not
be disposed to continually reconsider whether or not she should go. This is
the reason-centered aspect of commitment. Likewise, the intention is
conduct-controlling. A regular desire is not conduct-controlling. Though I
would like some chocolate right now this desire does not influence my
behavior. An intention to finish typing this sentence, will on the other hand,
influence my behavior. This is the volition-centered aspect of intention.
Bratman suggests that intentions characteristically play the following
three roles, the first two partly constituting the reason-centered dimension of
intentions, the third partly constituting the volition-centered dimension of
intentions.
An intention to do alpha will characteristically play these roles:
(R1) drive means-end reasoning regarding ha tI do alpha,
(R2) act as a background filter, screening out options the agent believes
to be incompatible with doing alpha, and
(R3) lead to endeavoring to do alpha.
Again, Bratman does not suggest that (R1)-(R3) are necessary or
sufficient conditions for intending. Rather, he says they are roles characteristic
of intentions. Let's take a closer look at each of the conditions above.
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According to (R1), once one has formed an intention to A, one then
needs to reason about how to do it. For example, once I form an intention to
go to California, I will then turn to the question: how am I going to do it? Am
I going to fly and if so, from what airport. Upon forming the intention to
leave from a certain airport, I will then turn to the question of how I'm going
to get to the airport. But what about the following sort of case: I form an
intention to go to work this morning. Assuming I take the same route to
work every day, I will not be disposed to reason further about how to get to
work. Does this show I lack the intention to go to work? No. Notice that if my
usual route is blocked by construction, then I will reason about the best
alternative route. Once one forms an intention, one is disposed to engage in
means-end reasoning. Whether one actually does engage in such reasoning
will depend upon a number of factors about the particular situation, most
notably, how complex carrying out the intention is and how many times one
has does something similar before.
According to (R2), if I am intending to meet you at the airport on
Thursday morning, then I will not also agree to have coffee with someone
else, somewhere else, at the same time. I will not to make plans which I
believe to be incompatible with my being at the airport Thursday morning at
ten. Imagine that a work associate tells you she will have lunch with you the
following day. Moments later you hear her making plans to have lunch with
someone else (somewhere else), also for the next day. Assuming you have
reason to believe that she is not planning to have two lunches tomorrow, you
will doubt whether she really intends to have lunch with you. This is because
if one intends to A, then one typically screens out options believed to be
incompatible with doing A.
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Endeavoring has to do with the link between intention and action. To
endeavor is to adjust one's behavior in response to signs of success or failure,
If I intend to meet you at the airport at ten a.m. and I see that I am running
late, I will speed up. Likewise, if I see that I have taken a wrong turn and am
no longer headed toward the airport, I will turn around so that I'm headed in
the right direction. Notice that even very simple intentions involve
endeavoring. Imagine that while reading a book, you form an intention to
have a sip of the coffee which is sitting on your desk. You reach for the coffee
while keeping your eyes on the book. If your hand does not immediately
make contact with the cup of coffee, you will move your hand around trying
to find the cup, and at some point, look up and allow visual cues to guide
your hand in the direction of the cup. So even this very simple case of
intending to have a sip of coffee involves endeavoring.
Now we come to the question of whether Bratman's view helps us to
reject Bennett's challenge. Bratman believes that his account does distinguish
the two bombers; that is, he believes his acount supports the view that the
terror bomber intends to 2ause civilians deaths and that the strategic bomber
does not. Let's apply (R1)-(R3) to the two bombers and see how this is
supposed to work.
The terror bomber will be disposed to reason further about how to
bring about civilian deaths. Perhaps he will deliberate over the height from
which he should drop the bomb in order to cause the most casualties. The
strategic bomber, on the other hand, will not reason further about how to
cause civilian deaths; perhaps he will be disposed to think about the best
height from which to bomb in order to ensure the total destruction of the
factory.
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The terror bomber, but not the strategic bomber, will rule out options
which are incompatible with causing civilian deaths. Bratman elaborates on
this by imagining that after settling on his plan to terrorize by causing civilian
deaths, the terror bomber considers ordering a certain troop movement. He
sees that this troop movement, while having certain military advantages,
would also alarm the enemy and cause them to evacuate the civilians he
plans to kill. Since moving the troops in this way has a consequence which he
sees is incompatible with his prior intention, he will not form a new
intention to move his troops in this way. 5 Bratman sees the prior intention as
forming a screen of admissibility. An option which is incompatible with an
already formed intention will not pass through the screen. 6
Notice that an intention to A not only leads one, in the typical case, to
refrain from forming intentions incompatible with A, it also leads one to
refrain from acting in ways which are incompatible with A-ing.
Finally, let's look at endeavoring. If the terror bomber were to see his
bomb did not in fact cause any civilian deaths, he would bomb again. If the
strategic bomber were to see that his bomb did not cause civilian deaths (but
did cause the destruction of the munitions plant), he would not bomb again.
Likewise, if the civilians were to run away from the armory upon hearing the
plane, the terror bomber would follow them, but the strategic bomber would
not.
According to Bratman, the terror bomber reasons about how to kill the
civilians, he screens out options believed to be incompatible with doing so,
5 Bratman (1987), p. 141
6 There are exceptions, new information can lead us to revise an intention we already have; I am
putting aside such cases, but Bratman's view does accommodate intention revision.
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and he endeavors to kill them. Not so the strategic bomber, Thus only the
terror bomber intends to kill the civilians.
4. Counterfactual Test Question
Let's turn now to Bennett's argument. Bennett assumes Anscombe's
account of intentions is the correct one. (I believe he has redutive views
generally in mind here.) So Bennett suggests that the difference between the
two bombers is that the terror bomber is in some way motivated by his
expectation that the raid will produce deaths while the strategic bomber is not
so motivated by the expectation of deaths. Bennett suggests the following: "If
intentions are determined by which of the person's beliefs motivate his
action, then we should be able to get at them by asking how the behavior
would have differed if the beliefs had differed in given ways." He then offers
the following, at least initially very plausible, counterfactual test question:
Counterfactual I~t Question: If you had believed that there
would be no civilian deaths, would you have been less likely to
go through with the raid? 7
The idea here is that a positive response to the Counterfactual Test
Question indicates an intention to bring about the deaths whereas a negative
response indicates the lack of such an intention. In considering how each
bomber would respond, we need to know what else is supposed to vary along
with the belief about civilian deaths. We are looking for an interpretation
under which the bombers answers to the test question differ. Bennett suggests
7This is the test question suggested by Jonathan Bennett is part IU of his Tanner Lectures (1981).
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that there are three possible interpretations and that the bombers answers
differ only on the third of these interpretations. He reasons as follows.
First Interpretation: Let's assume that the bombers in the
counterfactual situation differ from those in the actual situation only in this
way. In the counterfactual situation what varies is each bomber's belief that
the raid will cause deaths and any other of their beliefs which is logically
entailed by the belief that the raid causes no deaths, So under this
interpretation since each bomber believes no deaths result from the bombing,
each believes as well that no one is killed as a result of the bombing, In this
way, we do not need to assume that the bombers in the counterfactual
situation have inconsistent beliefs if they don't have inconsistent beliefs in
the actual world.
Bennett claims that this way of interpreting the test question will not
yield the desired results since on this interpretation both bombers answer the
test question No. He suggests that the strategic bomber answers No to the test
question since the strategic bomber retains his belief that the weapons plant is
destroyed. The terror bomber answers No because he retains his belief that
there will be terror as a result of the raid, So neither would be less motivated
to bomb,
It's puzzling why Bennett thinks that the strategic bomber retains his
belief that the weapons plant will be destroyed and that the terror bomber
retains his belief that there will be terror as a result of the raid. For example,
doesn't the strategic bomber think that the weapons will be destroyed only if
the civilians die? If so, then his believing that the there will be no deaths
(taken with the conditional belief: the factory will be destroyed only if there
are deaths) will entail that the factory is not destroyed. Perhaps Bennett
simply does not consider such conditional beliefs. In the end, it won't matter.
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If we do count such beliefs, it will turn out that under this first interpretation
both bombers answer Yes. So either way this is not the desired interpretation.
Bennett then considers a second interpretation.
Second Interpretation: Perhaps what varies in the counterfactual
situation is not only each bomber's belief about whether civilian deaths result
but also beliefs about anything the bombers take to be causally related to the
deaths. In that case, the terror bomber believes not only that there will be no
deaths, but also that there will be no terror, since he takes the terror to be
causally related to the deaths. So under this interpretation, he answers the test
question Yes.
What about the strategic bomber? He has the belief that the factory
can't be destroyed without killing the civilians. So he will suppose not only
that there will be no civilian deaths but also no factory destruction. In this
case he too will answer the counterfactual test question Yes, Again, we do not
have the desired interpretation.
Third Interpretation: Bennett points out that in order to get the test to
give the desired result (that the strategic bomber answer No to the test
question and the ,.0 ror bomber Yes) we need to assume that whr t varies in
the counterfactual situation is the belief about civilian deaths and anything
that follows from this belief by what Bennett has called "a causally
downstream inference". (Where x causes y and y causes z, x is causally
upstream from y while z is causally downstream from x. Thus a change in the
agent's belief about y would affect the agent's belief about z, but not about x.)
Let's look again at the counterfactual test question this time assuming
that what varies with the belief that there will be no civilian deaths is
anything the bomber takes to be related to the deaths in a causally
downstream way. The terror bomber believes that the terror is caused by the
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deaths. So in the case where he believes there will be no civilian deaths, he
also believes there will be no terror. Thus he will answer Yes to the test
question. The strategic bomber's believes there will be no deaths but since he
does not take the destruction of the munitions plant to be causally
downstream from the deaths, he retains his belief that the factory will be
destroyed. Thus, he will answer No to the counterfactual question.
It looks like we have found the desired interpretation of the test
question. Again, the test question was of this form;
"If you had believed that there would be no event of type G as a
result of your A-ing, would you have been less likely to A?"
And we are now assuming that, given the third interpretation of the test
question, we are able to pry apart the two bombers. The test question suggests
that the terror bomber is motivated by the expectation of civilian deaths and
the strategic bomber is not, thus only the terror bomber intends to bring about
the deaths.
5. Bennett's Reductio
It looks like we have found the interpretation of the test question
which yields the desired results. But Bennett argues that in fact, even this
interpretation, the one that looked all right, won't do, even it won't
distinguish the bombers. We assumed that the terror bomber would answer
the test question Yes (he would be less motivated to bomb). Bennett's strategy
is to show that we made this assumption too quickly. He begins by asking us
to consider the following "innocent" example:
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A political leader takes action against a trade union, intending to
bring about a month-long state of disintegration in which the
various locals break off from the parent body and severally fall
into further disunity. This is his intended means to the end of
the union's being unable to call a strike during December. He is
rightly sure that if the union falls apart for that long it will never
be reconstituted, but all he cares about or intends is the one-
month dissolution; if he were sure that the union would
recover during January and flourish for many years, that would
not reduce his motivation for moving against it.8
Bennett claims that the politician has 'killed the union' and done so
knowingly, but that all the politician intends to bring about is a one-month
dissolution. He argues:
(1) If feature F is a conjunction of features G and H, you don't intend
to produce an F unless you intend to produce a G and intend to
produce an H.
(2) Killing the union at the beginning of December involves the
union's being inoperative for all of December and the union's
being inoperative from January first on,
(3) The politician does not intend to produce an event with the
feature union inoperative in January,
(C) Therefore, the politician does not intend to kill the union.
The same line of reasoning can be applied to the case of the terror bomber,
with the analogous conclusion that the terror bomber does not intend to kill
the civilians. That argument runs like this:
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8Bennett (1981), 110
(1) If feature F is a conjunction of features G and H, you don't intend
to produce an F unless you intend to produce a G and intend to
produce an H.
(2') Killing the civilians involves making their bodies inoperative
for a while and making their bodies inoperative thereafter,
(3') The terror bomber does not intend to produce an event with the
feature civilians inoperative after the war,
(C') Therefore, the terror bomber does not intend to kill the civilians.
This argument is part of a reductio. Bennett is arguing that "the
concept of what is 'intended as a means' cannot be given a firm, clear,
theoretic grounding which implies what we think true and not what we
think false regarding what people intend,"9 His reductio starts by assuming
such an account of the notion 'intend as a means' can be given. He says there
is only one plausible account of intentions, according to which intentions are
given by which beliefs motivate an agent. (Such an account is what supports
(1) above). But when we apply the distinction between what is intended and
what is merely foreseen, so understood, to given cases, we get absurd results.
For example, we get the result that the terror bomber does not intend to bring
about deaths. But this is absurd and since there is no alternative account of
intentions available, we need to reject the assumption that the
'intend/foresee' distinction can be given a firm grounding; and thus, we
should not rest moral weight on this distinction.
Let's return now to (1)-(C') above. In reconstructing this line of
argument, I have stuck very closely to his words. For the conclusion (C') to
follow from the premises, (2') has to mean that being a killing is a feature of
some events, as are inoperativeness for a while and inoperativeness
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thereafter. Furthermore, we need to assume that being a killing is a
conjunction of the other two features. Some events are killings but it's not
clear what it is for an event to have the feature inoperativeness-for-a-while.
Perhaps Bennett has something like the following in mind. Some events
bring about permanent changes, Perhaps Bennett's view is that bringing
about permanent inoperativeness which begins at tl is a conjunction of
bringing about inoperativeness from t1 to t2 and bringing about
inoperativeness from t2 onward (where t2 follows tl). And, if one does not
intend to do something which brings about permanent inoperativeness, one
does not intend to kill.
(1), which I will henceforth call 'the Disjunction Principle', is doing
much of the work in the reductio and you might think there are obvious
counterexamples to it. Take a simple case: Max intends to remain a bachelor.
Won't Max intend to remain a bachelor simply by intending to remain
single? Does he additionally need to intend to remain male? However, this
case really isn't a counterexample to the Disjunction Principle. The example
makes a claim about whether Max intends to G (to remain a bachelor), but the
principle is not about whether one intends to G ; rather it is about whether
one intends to bring about an effect of kind G. The difference turns out to be
important. The latter formulation is more restrictive. It will only attribute to
an agent an intention to bring about a G if the agent believes a G to be an
upshot of one of her voluntary actions. Thus agents will not turn out to
intend things over which they lack the requisite sort of control. Return to the
example of Max. The Disjunction Principle would apply to a voluntary action
which Max takes to have as upshots his remaining single AND his remaining
male. One concocts a case in which Max is deliberating about whether to
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perform some such act, but I suspect that once the relevant story were told,
the case would not provide a counterexample to the Disjunction Principle.
Furthermore, there is reason to embrace the Disjunction Principle.
After all, the strategic bomber knowingly produces both the factory
destruction and the killing of civilians. We want to maintain that the
strategic bomber intends to produce the factory destruction but does not
intend to kill the civilians. The Disjunction Principle keeps us from
attributing intentions which are too coarse (eg; the strategic bomber intends to
produce deaths and destruction). Either we need to embrace the Disjunction
Principle or to endorse some other account of intentions which allows that
the strategic bomber does not intend to produce the deaths.
Bennett supports (3') by appeal to the counterfactual test question. The
bomber would not have been less motivated to carry through with his raid
had he believed the bombers would not be inoperative after the war, so he
does not intend to cause their inoperativeness after the war.
From these premises, it follows that the bomber does not intend to
cause the civilian deaths, that is, he does not intend to kill the civilians.
Bennett's conclusion here is not that we should delimit the scope of
intentions more narrowly than we are used to doing. Remember that the
terror bomber case is supposed to provide a paradigm example of intending to
kill as a means. Rather Bennett's conclusion is that on the only plausible
account he can find of what it is to intend as a means, we get the absurd
conclusion that the terror bomber does not intend to kill as a means, thus in
the absence of a satisfactory account of the notion 'intend as a means', the
notion should not bear moral weight.
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6. Initial Responses to Bennett
Something can be said to soften the blow of the reductio. Bennett
suggests that all the terror bomber intends is to bring about the civilians
temporary state of inoperativeness. But this is misleading. After all, we ask,
"how does the terror bomber plan to bring this result about?" Now Bennett
might answer simply "by dropping his bomb on them" but if we push the
point, it seems the bomber will tell us that dropping a bomb will cause the
civilians to be blown apart and being blown apart will cause the
inoperativeness (or perhaps it just is the inoperativeness). So the terror
bomber intends not only to cause inoperativeness for a while, but also
intends to cause the civilians to be blown apart. This may not soften the blow
of the reductio much, but I do think it helps some. Still, this response leaves
us with the troubling result that the terror bomber intends to cause civilians
to be blown apart, but does not intend to cause their deaths.
Many people's response to the claim that the terror bomber intends to
blow civilians to bits but not to kill them is that there is something
illegitimate about driving a wedge between these. As Foot said, some effects
are simply "too close" for the application of the Doctrine of Double Effect. 10
One might try to respond to Bennett by saying that some effects are "too close"
for one to be within the scope of the agent's intention and other outside of it.
(Thus, if el and e2 are sufficiently 'close', then if X intends to bring about el,
then X intends to bring about e2.) But then what is needed is an account of
when two effects are 'too close'. What we want is an account according to
which civilian deaths and civilians blown to bits are too close but civilian
deaths and the destruction of the armory (in STRATEGIC BOMBER) are not
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too close. I turn now to a couple of attempts to give such an account. Again,
these are attempts to say why it is unproblematic to claim the strategic bomber
intends to produce the armory destruction but not the deaths while it is
problematic to say the terror bomber intends to blow civilians to bits but not
to kill them.
Appeal to uncertainty
One might think that Bennett's objection fails to take accoui:+ of a
difference in probabilities. Since intentions are dependent upon beliefs, the
relevant notion would be some notion of subjective probability. According to
this reply, the terror bomber is certain that if he blows the civilians to bits,
they will die. On the other hand, the strategic bomber may believe there is a
chance that he will cause destruction to the armory without causing civilian
deaths,
I think this objection misses the point. As Bennett points out, "we
have the notion of what is not intended but is foreseen as an inevitable by-
product of one's means." 11 Defenders of the Doctrine of Double Effect do not
have in mind that the difference in the bomber's intentions is traceable to any
difference in probabilities. We can assume that the strategic bomber does not
think there is a chance that the armory will be destroyed but that there will be
no civilians deaths caused by his bomb--he considers the civilian deaths an
inevitable upshot of dropping his bomb. Still, we want to say he does not
intend to bring them about. (Perhaps both bombers believe there is a chance





A second attempt to say when two effects are "too close" focuses on the
following: even though the strategic bomber is certain that bombing this
particular area at this particular time will cause civilian deaths, he believes
that many armory bombings don't cause civilian deaths. It is often possible to
blow up a military target without harming civilians. Not so for terror
bombings. Blowing people to bits invariably causes death.
Warren Quinn has argued that appeals to invariability fail. He points
out that hysterectomies do not invariably lead to the death of a fetus; in fact,
presumably they usually do not involve any such death. So far, by the
invariability criterion, a doctor might foresee that performing a hysterectomy
in a certain case (the woman is pregnant) will cause a death but the doctor
need not intend to bring about the death. However, notes Quinn, all
hysterectomies performed on pregnant women do involve the death of a
fetus. We can make trouble for the invariability criterion in the following
way. Quinn asks us to suppose "that hysterectomies performed on patients
who are in the early months of pregnancy are distinguished by the use of a
special anesthetic that is safer for the patient and, in itself, harmless to the
fetus." If this were so, then these hysterectomies could be separated out from
other hysterectomies and one feature of these hysterectomies is that they
would invariably result in the death of the fetus. Now it would turn out by
the invariability criterion, that when a hysterectomy on a pregnant woman is
performed, the foreseen death of the fetus is intended. Presumably the same
sort of move could be made in the case of strategic bombing too. So the
invariability criterion will not be helpful.
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These last two replies attempt to say when two effects are 'too close' for
one to be within the scope of the agent's intention, the other not. The
following replies attempt in other ways to block Bennett's conclusion,
Objection to F-for-a-while
Consider the Disjunction Principle again. First there is the question of
when feature F is a conjunction of features G and H. 'Being a bachelor' may
well be a conjunction of 'being single' and 'being a male'. But we might
wonder: Is 'being a yellow yardstick' a conjunction of 'being a stick which is
yellow for eighteen inches' and then 'being a stick which is yellow for a
second eighteen inches'? Is getting four hours of relief from cold symptons a
conjunction of getting one hour of cold relief and then three more? Let's
assume so. Then it will follow that as I approach the yardstick with my
paintbrush, I intend to bring it about that the yardstick be yellow only if I
intend to bring it about that the first eighteen inches is yellow and I intend to
bring it about that the second eighteen inches is yellow. Likewise, in taking
some medicine, I intend to get four hours of relief from cold symptons only if
I intend to get the first hour of cold relief and I intend to get the next three
hours of cold relief (and of course: only if I intend to get the first ten minutes
of cold relief and then the next 3 hours and 50 minutes of cold relief, and so
on). This all begins to look very unappealing. Furthermore, Bennett's
troublesome results all involve cases of permanent and irreversible change.
They all involve the claim that a feature of the form 'F forever' is a
conjunction of the features 'F for a while' and 'F thereafter'. I will say that
such cases involve 'temporal disjunction'. Why not simply disallow
temporal disjunction?
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Bennett's reply is that if we rule out such cases we disallow the
reasonable conclusion that the politician intends to bring about only a one-
month break up of the union. The politician is assumed not to intend to
bring about the January stage of the union's inoperativeness since he is not
motivated by the belief that he will bring that stage of inoperativeness about.
But Bennett relies upon temporal disjunction to get from the claim that he
January stage of inoperativeness is unintended to the claim that the
permanent inoperativeness is unintended.
Ahistorical Reply
Someone might expect his action to produce an F and a G and have
only the coarse-grained thought of an F-and-G, and not thought of producing
an 'F without a G'. Gilbert Harman has raised this point and Bennett
concedes that in such a case the test would seem to too finely delimit the
scope of the person's intention. In certain cases, it will attribute to a person
the intention to produce an F without a G when the person has no such
concept. But Bennett is quick to point out that this does not rebut his
argument since the terror bomber does have the concept of bodily
inoperativeness.
Appeal to Structural Asymmetnry
One might think that Bennett's point misses a structural asymmetry
between the case of the strategic bomber and that of the terror bomber. The
terror bomber believes that his ends (terror and a drop in enemy morale) flow
causally from the deaths themselves. The strategic bomber believes that his
end (weakening the enemy militarily) flows causally from the destruction of
the armory but not from the deaths. However, this response is question-
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begging. Bennett would reply that the terror bomber does not believe the drop
in morale flows from the deaths but from something narrower, from the
inoperativeness of the civilians, (And he can stress again that death itself isn't
required since the terror bomber's aim is compatible with the civilians being
miraculously restored to life at some later time.)
Anscombe's Approach
Following Elizabeth Anscombe, we might adopt as a test for whether
someone intends to bring about a certain effect asking them why they are
bringing it about. If their response is of the form "to..." then they intend to
bring it about. But if their response is of the form "it couldn't be helped", then
they don't intend to bring it about.
Warren Quinn explains why this sort of approach fails. Bennett's
objection just needs to be rephrased. The point is, the terror bomber may
respond to the question "why are you bringing about deaths?" by saying "'the
actual deaths can't be helped if I am to create the realistic appearance of death
and destruction."' 12
It is unsurprising that appealing to Anscombe's test is unhelpful. As I
have pointed out, Bennett relies on a reductive account of intentions, like
Anscombe's. This raises the question of whether Bennett's objection is
dependent upon one particular view of intentions. (3') after all is a claim
about what the terror bomber intends and (3') is supported by appeal to the
counterfactual test (which is an expression of an Anscombe-type view of
intentions).
12W. Quinn, "Actions, Intentions, and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect", (1989), 340
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Bratman's Approach
Remember that Bennett has assumed an Anscombe-like view of
intentions. We might wonder whether his argument isn't really a reductio of
Anscombe's view. Perhaps the problem does not arise on Bratman's view.
Bratman's view certainly offers more resources than does Anscombe's for
addressing objections like Bennett's. This is largely due to the fact that his
account incorporates reasoning-centered aspects of intentions, not merely
volitional ones. But I think in the end Bennett's objection makes trouble for
Bratman's view too. This is most apparent with endeavoring and screening-
out incompatible options because these are made out counterfactually. Let's
look at endeavoring again.
Bratman claims that if the terror bomber were to believe he had missed
the civilians, he would consider his raid unsuccessful and bomb again. But
Bennett can argue that this does not show the bomber intends to kill the
civilians. If the civilians were to miraculously recover after the war, the terror
bomber would not circle back and bomb again. Or, if the bomber were to find
out later that the bomb he had dropped was a new experimental sort of bomb
which causes inoperativeness for a while, but not death, he would consider
his raid successful as long as the inoperativeness lasted long enough to cause
terror. Such counterfactuals either need to be ruled out as somehow
illegitimate, or we need to conclude that the terror bomber endeavors to
make civilians inoperative for a while, but not forever.
This is the endeavoring component. But as we have seen, Bratman's
view has further resources. By looking at what the agent would screen off as
incompatible, I think we'll get much the same result as we do with
endeavoring (this is because both are roles get explicated by appeal to
counterfactuals). But let's look at means-end reasoning. Surely a standard
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terror bomber simply reasons about how to kill the civilians, not to make
them inoperative. Perhaps this helps, but it's unclear. Bratman does not
address situations in which the roles laid out above pull in different
directions. If endeavoring suggests an agent intends to bring about an N as a
means and means-end reasoning suggests the agent intends to bring about an
M, what does the agent intend? One might try to address Bennett's objection
by stipulating that in cases where endeavoring and means-end reasoning pull
apart, more weight should be given to means-end reasoning. But we want to
know why this should be so.
Furthermore, we might wonder why actual means-end reasoning is
relevant to intentions as opposed to how an agent would reason? If we take
into consideration how an agent would act, not just how an agent does act,
then why not look at how an agent would reason? For example, if we
suggested to the terror bomber that inoperativeness for a while would suffice
to bring about his end, then he might well be disposed to think about how to
bring about inoperativeness for a while. (Again, notice this is not so with an
ethnic cleansing bomber.) And, even if we restrict ourselves to the agent's
actual reasoning, trouble can be made for Bratman's account.
Imagine a group of terror bombers have been to West Point where they
learned to think not about causing deaths, but merely about causing terror by
causing bodily inoperativeness for a while. Their means-end reasoning is
about how to bring on inoperativeness which will bring about terror. 13 The
most expedient way is to use a bomb which they foresee will cause deaths, but
this, they are quick to point out, is unintended. Unless we are prepared to say
that these bombers really do intend to bring about mere inoperativeness, then
13This particular formulation of the problem was suggested to me by Bratman.
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there is no point in developing the option of putting more weight on means-
end reasoning. It seems to me that in such a case, our response is that these
bombers are somehow deceiving themselves, not that they really do intend to
bring about mere bodily inoperativeness. It looks as though Bennett's
objection makes trouble for Bratman's account of intending as well.
Even in spite of the failure of these replies, I am not prepared to follow
Bennett in concluding that the notion intended as a means cannot be given a
firm theoretical grounding. 14 However, we have seen that the problem
Bennett raises is a serious one. Warren Quinn accepts Bennett's argument
against the Ordinary View but tries to salvage something of the Doctrine of
Double Effect by offering an alternative principle. This alternative is meant to
do the normative work of the DDE while avoiding Bennett's objection. I will
be returning to Bennett, but for now, let's suppose as Quinn does that
Bennett's objection holds and have a look at Quinn's view.
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Chapter Three:
Direct Agency: Quinn's Response to Bennett
1. Introduction
The objection raised by Bennett is a serious one--it is not as simply
solved as first glances may suggest. Warren Quinn responds to Bennett's
objection by offering a new distinction, one which Quinn claims does the
moral work typically attributed to DDE but which is not subject to Bennett's
objection. 1 Quinn suggests that we distinguish what he calls 'harmful direct
agency' from what he calls 'harmful indirect agency', And, he suggests a two-
part principle as a sort of replacement for DDE (I will call his two-part
principle DDE*). The second part of DDE* is parasitic on the first part, but the
first part is meant to stand alone--it is not dependent upon the second part.
2. DDE* part-one
The first part of DDE* is as follows:
DDE* part-one: Harmful direct agency is morally worse, and thus
harder to justify, than harmful indirect agency,2
1 Warren Quinn, "Actions, Intentions and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect", 1987.
2Notice that Quinn gives a comparative formulation. It says that certain types of agency are worse
than other types, it does not say that this difference matters to permissibility. In chapter 1, I gave a
noncomparative formulation of DDE. For the most part, the differences between the comparative and
noncomparative formulations won't be relevant here. I do discuss the two formulations briefly toward
the end of the chapter.
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Since the principle relies on the notions of harmful direct agency and
harmful indirect agency, I will discuss these in turn. Quinn defines harmful
direct agency as "agency in which harm comes to some victims, at least in
part, from the agent's deliberately involving [the victims] in something ilL
order to further his purpose precisely by way of their being so involved...",
This definition of harmful direct agency has three parts; that is there seem to
be three conditions which taken together provide necessary and sufficient
conditions for harmful direct agency. X is a direct agent of harm to Y if and
only if:
(i) X harms Y3
(ii) X deliberately involves Y in a plan in order to further her
(X's) own purpose
(iii) The harm to Y is at least partly a result of X's deliberately
involving Y in the plan,
Let's take a brief look at each of these conditions and see what work
each does.
Condition (i) plays two roles: first, it rules out as harmful direct agency
any case in which no one is harmed. Second, it rules out cases in which
someone is harmed but not by anyone's agency. For example, if Jed is harmed
by a hurricane, this won't count as harmful direct agency.4
Condition (ii) works to rule out cases where one person causes harm to
another, but in a completely accidental way. It will, for example, rule out a
case where a driver accidentally hits a pedestrian. Such a case counts as one of
3 By this I mean that X is the agent of harm to Y. If Z pushes X into Y, then Z harms Y, but X does not
harm Y.
4It might be thought that (i) is too strong; that Quinn is attempting to introduce a subtler notion of
agency which requires only that (1) Y is in fact harmed and (2) that the harm to Y is connected in the
right way to an intention of X's. I discuss this view shortly,
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harmful agency, but the case does not count as harmful direct agency since the
driver does not deliberately involve the pedestrian in a plan,5
Condition (iii) links together (i) and (ii), (i) and (ii) leave open the
possibility that the agent causes harm to the victim and the agent is
deliberately involving the victim in a plan, but that the two are unconnected.
It rules out the following kind of case:
Adam is need of cash. He comes up with a plan to rob a local
store, His plan involves setting up his friend Mike to take the
blame should anything go wrong. Around the same time, he
accidentally hits a pedestrian with his car. The pedestrian turns
out to be Mike,
5 (ii) also rules out cases in which one person involves another in a plan but not for advancement of her
own purpose, However, I think we should not take 'for her own purpose' to mean 'in her own interest',
Quinn categorizes the agency of the terror bomber as harmful direct agency even though the terror
bomber may be acting in the interest of his country, not himself, We can say that the terror bomber
involves the civilians for his own purpose if we understand this to mean simply that he thinks
involving them advances the interests of one of his ends. (So I am assuming Quinn allows that our ends
are sometimes to do with what's in the interest of others), I think that (ii) is best understood as ruling
out cases in which the agent has the victim's own interests in mind. For example, if I involve you in a
scheme in order to keep you out of the house while a surprise party is planned for you, then, even if
harm should come to you as a result of this plan, the case will not count as harmful direct agency since I
am attempting to do something for you rather than to further my own purpose.
Someone might object that I make the surprise party my own purpose; I have made your
interests my own. So even in this case, I do deliberately involve you in a plan to further my own ends,
Because Quinn is interested in the disrespect which he thinks attaches to involving others in one's
plans, I think such cases don't count as satisfying (ii). When one person makes another's interests his
own, this is typically a sign of respect, not disrespect. I will put aside complicated cases where one
person misjudges what is in the interest of others as well as questions about paternalism,
Quinn specifies that the agent deliberately involves the victim in order to further his own purpose
precisely by way of their [the victim] being so involved. I have dropped this last part from (i)-(iii)
because I cannot see what it adds. I cannot think of a case in which X deliberately involves Y in
something in order to further his (X's) own purpose but does not plan to further his own purpose
precisely by way of Y being involved. To involve Y in order to further a purpose is to plan to further the
purpose precisely by way of involving Y.
It also rules out a case in where one person is both agent and victim; Quinn is not explicit on this but I
think it is natural to understand his account as ruling out such cases.
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This case meets conditions (i) and (ii). Adam harms Mike and Adam is
deliberately involving Mike in a plan to further his own purpose. But the two
are not connected. We are to assume in the above case that Adam's plan to
involve Mike in the robbery is not related to his hitting Mike. (iii) rules out
such cases.
So far, I have been discussing harmful direct agency, DDE* part-one
relies on a distinction between harmful direct and harmful indirect agency.
Now let's look at harmful indirect agency. Quinn defines "harmful indirect
agerLcy" as "agency in which either nothing is in that way intended for the
victims or what is so intended does not contribute to their harm."6 What does
he mean by "in that way intended..."? He is referring to the way in which
harm is intended in cases of harmful direct agency. He is saying that in cases
of harmful indirect agency either condition (iii) is not met (what is so
intended does not contribute to the agent's harm) or both (ii) and (iii) are not
met (nothing is in that way intended for the victims). (If (ii) is not met, (iii)
will not be either. ) Notice that condition (i) is met in cases of harmful
indirect agency, otherwise the case would not be one of harmful agency. So in
these cases, although the agent harms the victim, the agent fails to
deliberately involve the victim in a plan or the agent does involve the victim
in a plan but the harm is unrelated to this involvement.
The account I have given of Quinn's distinction strays some from the
most natural reading of his words, so I want to briefly defend my account. The
way Quinn explains harmful direct agency may give the impression he is
introducing a subtler notion of agency, one which does not require condition
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(i),7 A first reading of Quinn's words suggests that if X intentionally involves
Y in something and as a result of this involvement Y is harmed, then X is a
direct agent of harm to Y. X need do nothing more than intentionally involve
Y in something which turns out to be harmful. I think that, in the end, this is
not the best way to interpret Quinn and I will briefly mention a couple of
reasons to reject this interpretation. First, notice that on such an account X's
intentional involvement of Y will play a double role: it will be what makes
the case direct agency not indirect, and what makes the case one of agency at
all. The problem with allowing one condition to play this double role
emerges when one considers harmful indirect agency. Recall that indirect
agency is defined as agency in which "either nothing is in that way intended
for the victims or what is so intended does not contribute to their harm."
Take the first disjunct. If nothing is 'in that way intended for the victims' and
it is just such an intention which makes the case one of agency at all, then in
the absence of the relevant intention we have not a case of harmful indirect
agency but a case involving no agency at all. On this reading, DDE*
distinguishes harmful direct agency from accidents and other events. This is
surely not right for a principle meant to do the work of DDE.
Notice though that this point argues only against taking (ii) and (iii) (p.
59) as the sole necessary conditions for harmful direct agency. It does not
argue against something weaker than (i) which might provide an additional
necessary condition for harmful direct agency as well as a sufficient condition
for harmful indirect agency.
The second reason to reject the the more natural reading of Quinn's
distinction is that this reading renders DDE* subject to devastating
7This is in fact how Fischer, Ravizza, and Copp interpret Quinn, i n Fischer et al (1993), I discuss their
objections to Quinn in the final section of this chapter.
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counterexamples. I discuss some of these in the final section of this chapter
when I evaluate the objections to DDE* made by Fischer et al,
I believe the idea behind Quinn's harmful direct agency is not to
introduce a subtler notion of agency, such that having a harmful intention
which causally contributes to actual harm is enough for to make one the
direct agent of harm. Rather, I think Quinn's insight is that it does not matter
whether, for example, the terror bomber's aim is to kill, dismember, or
merely blow apart the civilians. We should be focusing instead simply on the
fact that the terror bomber intends to do something harmful to the civilians
as a way to further his end. Quinn is attempting to offer a principle which
will mark the terror bomber's agency as morally impermissible whether or
not the terror bomber is intending to cause death or mere inoperativeness.
Even if we accept (i) through (iii) as providing necessary conditions for
harmful direct agency, DDE* differs importantly from DDE. Recall that DDE
says:
The Doctrine of Double Effect (UDE): Where an agent, X, expects
to produce two effects by A-ing, one of them bad and the other
good, it is impermissible for X to A if she intends to bring about
the bad effect and permissible for her to A if she does not intend
to bring about the bad effect.
DDE divides cases of foreseen harm into two classes--those in which
the agent intends to produce the harm and those in which the agent does not
intend to produce the harm. DDE*, on the other hand, does not restrict itself
to harms which are foreseen and most surprisingly, discriminates against
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some cases in which the agent not only does not intend the harm but does
not even foreseen it. To see the difference, consider the following case:
Frank is having trouble with his car, He invites his friend Jane
over, knowing he can persuade her to help him fix his car.
While Jane is under the car, she asks Frank to turn on the
engine and put the car in neutral, Frank accidentally puts the
car in reverse and unwittingly backs it over Jane.
This case counts as one of harmful direct agency. Frank's agency
satisfies conditions (i), (ii) and (iii), Frank harms Jane (by running the car over
her). He deliberately involved her in a plan for his own purposes. And, she is
harmed as a result of being involved in this plan. DDE* discriminates against
this case while it falls outside the scope of the Doctrine of Double Effect.
I believe Quinn intended his principle to apply only to cases of foreseen
harms; there are at least three reasons for thinking this is so. First, charity
demands it: if his principle is not so understood, it is subject to crippling
counterexamples. 8 Second, he is offering a replacement principle for DDE. If
we do not understand his principle to apply only to cases of foreseen harm
then it will turn out to differ from DDE too much to be considered a
replacement for DDE. Third, in a footnote Quinn suggests the doctrine of
double effect (however it is formulated) puts a set of necessary conditions on
morally permissible agency in which a foreseen harmful upshot is brought
about. He suggests that his version of the doctrine works in the same way. 9 I
see no reason why Quinn could not have counted as harmful direct agency
only those cases in which the agent foresees the harm. While it is
8 I discuss such examples in the final section of this chapter.
9 See footnote 3 of his article.
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unfortunate that he didn't make this qualification explicit, I think he simply
assumed it and that we should amend the above account of harmful direct
agency so that it takes this qualification into account. I suggest we amend the
conditions above for harmful direct and harmful indirect agency by replacing:
(i) X harms Y
with
(i') X harms Y and foresees that she will harm Y.
I take the following to be necessary and sufficient conditions for harmful
direct agency;
(i') X harms Y and foresees that she will harm Y.
(ii) X deliberately involves Y in a plan in order to further her (X's)
own purpose
(iii) The harm to Y is at least partly a result of X's deliberately
involving Y in the plan.
With this change, DDE* will now divide cases of foreseen harm into
two classes-direct and indirect--and thus will be more like DDE in an
important respect. Here is a reminder of DDE* part-one:
DDE* part-one: It is morally worse to bring about harm by direct
agency than it is to bring about harm by indirect agency.
The second part of Quinn's replacement principle relies upon a distinction of
harmful direct agency into two types: opportunistic agency and eliminative
agency. I will discuss this further division in more detail later. For now, a
statement of DDE* part-two is as follows:
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DDE* part-two: opportunisitic harmful direct agency is morally
worse than eliminative harmful direct agency.
Quinn believes that there are three things favoring DDE* over DDE.
First, he thinks that because DDE* employs a distinction which differs slightly
from the distinction between intended and merely foreseen consequences, it
is not plagued by Bennett's objection. 10 Second, he thinks that DDE* can
explain more about our intuitions in paired cases than DDE. Specifically what
he has in mind is this: he thinks that intuition tells us the terror bomber's
action is morally worse than the strategic bomber's. Likewise says Quinn,
intuition tells us that a surgeon who performs a craniotomy which results in
the death of the fetus does something morally worse than a surgeon who
performs a hysterectomy on a pregnant woman, where this also results in the
death of the fetus. But Quinn believes tnat we intuitively find the moral gap
between the bombers larger than the gap between the surgeons. Furthermore,
he believes that this asymmetry cannot be explained by DDE but can be
explained by DDE* (in virtue of its two parts working together). Third, Quinn
claims that it is easier to see the rationale for the distinction drawn by DDE*
than it is to see the moral significance of the distinction relied upon by DDE.
In the rest of this chapter, I argue that although DDE* appears to avoid
Bennett's objection, in fact it does not. Bennett's objection applies to DDE* as
well. Then I look at Quinn's claim that DDE* can explain asymmetries in our
intuitions about the different pairs of cases. Here I examine DDE* part-two
and argue that it does not divide up some of the relevant pairs of cases in the
10Chapter 2 contains an extensive discussion of this problem
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right way. Thus, two of the points DDE* is taken to have in its favor over
DDE do not hold up. Finally I defend DDE* part-one from some recent
criticism in the literature, I conclude that we should reject DDE* part-two and
that DDE* part-one and DDE are roughly on a par--neither helps get around
Bennett's objection.
3. DDE* Applied to the Bombers
Quinn claims that DDE* draws a moral distinction between the
bombers in a way which is not subject to Bennett's objection, or to problems
of "closeness" generally. To see what Quinn has in mind, consider the terror
bomber first. Of the terror bomber, Quinn writes:
,..the bomber undeniably intends in the strictest sense that the
civilians be involved in a certain explosion, which he produces,
precisely because their involvement in it serves his goal... [H]is
purpose requires at least this--that they be violently impacted by
the explosion of his bombs. 11
Quinn's point is that even if the terror bomber does not intend to cause
the actual deaths of the civilians, he at least intends to involve them in
something which is harmful. And this, it turns out, will suffice for harmful
direct agency. The case meets the necessary and sufficient conditions for
harmful direct agency set out above. The terror bomber harms the civilians.
The terror bomber deliberately involves the civilians in his plan, and the
harm comes to the civilians at least in part by way of the bomber deliberately
involving them. Notice the harm itself need not be intended; what matters is
that the inavolvement of the civilians is intended. This then gets around the
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11Quinn, p. 342.
question of whether the bomber intended to cause the civilians deaths, or
merely their dismemberment, or perhaps only their temporary
inoperativeness.
Now let's turn to the strategic bomber. Quinn argues that this is a case
of harmful indirect agency. He reasons as follows: STRATEGIC BOMBER is a
case of harmful agency since condition (i) is met--the strategic bomber harms
the civilians and foresees he will do. But it is not a case of harmful direct
agency since condition (ii) is not met. The strategic bomber does not
deliberately involve the civilians in his plan. Their involvement is
incidental to his purpose.
This then is what I think Quinn has in mind when he claims that
DDE* is not subject to Bennett's objection. Bennett's objection was to the
notion 'intended as a means' and DDE* does not rely on this notion.
But I think Quinn is wrong. The problem is with whether condition
(ii) is met. Quinn claims that that the strategic bomber's agency is not direct
because condition (ii) is not met: the strategic bomber does not deliberately
involve the civilians in his plan. But why think this? After all, the strategic
bomber knows the civilians are present, he deliberates over what to do. He
chooses to bomb, foreseeing he will cause them harm. Whether or not this is
a case of harmful indirect agency hinges on whether condition (ii) is met.
Quinn uses 'deliberately' and 'intentionally' interchangeably, I can find no
reason to think he has in mind an account of doing something deliberately
which differs importantly from doing it intentionally or intending to do it. So
the question remains: why think the strategic bomber does not deliberately
involve the civilians; otherwise put, why think he does not intend to
involve them?
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One might try to defend Quinn's assumption that (ii) is not met by
noting that the strategic bomber would answer No to the following
counterfactual test question: "If you believed that no civilians would be
involved in the explosion, would you be less likely to bomb?" After all, the
strategic bomber would be just as happy were no civilians around. His plan
does not in any way require the presence of civilians. Notice by way of
contrast that the terror bomber would answer Yes. He would change his plans
if he were to find no civilians were in the area.
So far, it looks as though Quinn is right that DDE* avoids Bennett's
objection. But I think that DDE*'s success at dividing up the bombers the right
way is dependent on the particular way in which the terror bomber case
happens to be described. To show this, I will introduce an altered version of
the terror bomber case which I think will cause problems for DDE*.
4. City Bomber Objection to DDE*
Consider the following case:
CITY BOMBER: The city bomber wishes to demoralize enemy
leaders. He knows that the leaders are residing in a hideaway in
the mountains above the city. Here they have a view of the city
and are free from danger. The city bomber knows that if he
explodes bombs over the center of the city, the leaders will be
convinced that the city population has been destroyed and are
likely to concede. 12
12This case is slightly varied from a case Quinn discusses (see f.n. 16) and attributes to David Lewis.
Quinn argues that DDE* handles Lewis's case but I think DDE* will not handle this slightly varied
case.
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Now I want to argue (1) that the city bomber's harmful agency is
indirect, not direct, but (2) the city bomber is morally closer to the terror
bomber than the strategic bomber. So I am arguing that DDE* should
discriminate against the city bomber, just like it discriminates against the
terror bomber, while in fact it discriminates in favor of the city bomber.
Another way of putting this is that DDE* draws a line which leaves the terror
bomber on one side and both the city bomber and the strategic bomber on the
other side. I think it should draw a line between which puts the city bomber
on the same side as the terror bomber.
The city bomber believes that to achieve his purpose, he must target an
area which the leaders believe to be heavily populated; the city center serves
this purpose. The city bomber's agency is direct only if he deliberately
involves the population in the explosion. Does the city bomber deliberately
involve the civilians in his plan? Let's appeal again to a counterfactual test
question. We might ask the city bomber: "If you had believed that no civilians
would be involved in the explosion, would you have altered your plans?"
The city bomber will answer No. He will answer No because he is indifferent
to whether there are any civilians actually in the city center at the time he
bombs. He believes that to achieve his purpose he needs only to cause the
leaders to believe that civilians have been killed. And this can be done by
dropping a bomb or bombs over the city center regardless of whether civilians
are present or not.
Just as the terror bomber was indifferent to the actual deaths of
civilians (he needed only to cause a belief in the deaths), the city bomber is
indifferent to the actual involvement of the civilians (he needs only to cause
a belief that civilians were involved). If the city bomber came to believe that
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civilians had been warned of the upcoming bombing and (it being a fairly
small city) had all evacuated in the night, he would bomb just the same, As
long as he thinks the city leaders believe the city center is populated, then
whether it is actually populated or not is irrelevant to his purpose.
This example should make clear that DDE* does not escape Bennett's
objection. Now, instead of a problem about whether the terror bomber
intends to cause deaths, or merely temporary inoperativeness, we have a
problem about whether the city bomber intends to involve the civilians
themselves or only the city center. This new problem arises out of the same
sorts of considerations as the old one (just as the terror bomber does not
require actual civilian deaths,the city bomber does not require that any
civilians be actually involved.)
Quinn seems to have thought that Bennett's objection could be
avoided by looking not at whether an agent intends to cause harm but at
whether the agent intends to involve someone in a plan. But Bennett's
objection is to the notion 'intend as a means'. While this notion plays a more
visible role in DDE (which rests upon the distinction between intended and
merely foreseen harms), it plays a crucial role in DDE* nonetheless, 13 Since
Bennett's objection is to this notion, switching the focus of the principle from
whether certain an agent intends to harm as a means (DDE) to whether the
agent intends to involve the victim.., as a means (DDE*) will not help.
My objection to DDE* relies upon the assumption that DDE* ought to
discriminate against the city bomber. I assume that if the original terror
bomber case counts as harmful direct agency, the city bomber case ought to
13As I have noted above (fn 4) Quinn is not trading on a difference between 'deliberately does A and
'intends to do A. This can be seen by comparing his definitions 'harmful direct agency' and 'harmful
indirect agency', He uses one expression in the former and the other in the latter,
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count as harmful direct agency too. But there is room for disagreement here.
Quinn might argue that it is a point in favor of DDE* that it treats the terror
bomber and the city bomber differently. After all, the former targets people
while the latter targets places. This, he might argue, makes the city bomber's
agency morally closer to that of the strategic bomber than to that of the terror
bomber. 14
I think this reply is inadequate. If the city bomber himself issued a
warning to the civilians so that they could, unbeknownst to the leaders,
evacuate in the night, then I think this response would be right; there is an
important moral difference between that city bomber and the city bomber I
discuss. The city bomber I discuss does not do this. He chooses the city center
because it is an area which he thinks the leaders will assume to be populated
(at the time of the bombing). Let us assume that he plans to drop his bomb on
Wednesday evening. Then, he will look for an area which the leaders have
every reason to believe is populated at Wednesday evenings. Again, if he
were to search and search for an area such that it is usually populated
Wednesday nights and which is such that the leaders will think it is
populated on the Wednesday night of his bombing, but which in fact, for
some reason or other, is not populated on this particular Wednesday
evening, then morally this bomber would he would be more like the strategic
bomber. But he does no such thing.
The force of Bennett's objection is this: although the area the city
bomber chooses is populated, the city bomber believes that the area need not
14 1n fact, I think Quinn would not have argued this way. See fn 16 of Quinn's paper. Quinn explains
that he altered his original formulation of harmful direct agency in response to an objection posed by
David Lewis. It seems to me that if Quinn were going to argue here that targeting city centers is
importantly different from targeting the population, he would have made a similar response to Lewis
instead of changing the formulation of 'harmful direct agency'.
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be currently populated in order for him to achieve his end, Now I want to
claim that this fact about him does not make him morally closer to the
strategic bomber than the terror bomber,
This point may come out more clearly if we consider an actual case of
city bombing-the United States bombing of Hiroshima in World War II. The
aim of the U.S. was to prove to the Japanese the extent of American power.
Let's charitably assume the following: Had it been possible to drop an atomic
bomb over Hiroshima, cause the destruction of the city, and yet not cause
harm to civilians, Truman and the U.S. military leaders would have chosen
to do so. Even if this is so, surely it does not make the actual bombing a
strategic bombing rather than a terror bombing.
For someone to argue that the city bomber case is morally on a par with
the case of the strategic bomber, not the terror bomber, he would have to be
willing to morally distinguish bombers who deliberately involve people in
their plans, (that is, they require that the area they target is currently
populated) from bombers who do not deliberately involve people in their
plans but do deliberately involve areas which they know to be populated, like
hospitals, city centers, and malls, Furthermore, certain bombings (like city
bomber's) would no longer count as terror bombings, even though they work
(reach their end) by creating terror.1 5 I think this is an undesirable route to
take and I think it is a route Quinn would not want to take.
With regard to Bennett's original objection (that the terror bomber
does not intend to cause deaths, just temporary inoperativeness), Quinn
writes: "This line of objection clearly threatens to deprive the doctrine [of
double effect] of most of its natural applications." I think many proponents of
15This was pointed out to me by Walter Sinnott-Armstrong,
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Double Effect would say the same here; if DDE* avoids Bennett's objection
only by distinguishing terror bombers who bomb city centers and malls
because they are currently populated from terror bombers who target these
locations because the leaders believe them to be populated, then the doctrine
has been deprived of most of its natural applications.
I have been assuming that a supporter of Quinn would appeal to a
counterfactual test question to defend the claim that the strategic bomber does
not intend to involve the civilians while the terror bomber does. But perhaps
Quinn was rejecting Bennett's counterfactual test. Here I think supporters of
Quinn face a dilemma. Either they provide us with an account of intending to
involve as a means which does not rely on counterfactual test questions or
they appeal to counterfactuals. If they appeal to counterfactuals, then, as I
have just argued, they will run into Bennett's objection. If Quinn has some
other account of the notion 'intend to involve as a means', then why switch
introduce the notions 'direct agency' and 'indirect agency' at all? Why not
stick with the original Doctrine of Double Effect?
My own view is that Quinn did not have in mind an alternative to the
counterfactual test. Quinn's response to Bennett does not seem to be that we
ought to reject counterfactual test questions, but that we ought to see that we
didn't have quite the right distinction before. The distinction between
intended and merely foreseen consequences is not quite the significant
distinction, but the one between harmful direct agency and harmful indirect
agency is the distinction which is morally significant. Quinn suggests that
what is importantly different about his view is not that he has a different idea
of intending, rather, it is that DDE* focuses on whether or not an agent
intends to involve the victim, rather than on whether an agent intends to
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cause the harm itself. But then, we do not have a way around Bennett's
objection.
To summarize, Quinn's notion direct agency relies upon the notion
intending as a means. Bennett has made trouble for the idea of intending as a
means. Quinn must either (1) offer an unproblematic way of making out
what an agent intends as a means, or (2) show that what was a problem for
intending versus foreseeing is not a problem for direct versus indirect agency.
If he has an unproblematic way of making out what is intended versus what
is merely foreseen, then why introduce the new distinction at all? If he does
not have an unproblematic way of making out what is intended, then he
really can't get around Bennett's objection by introducing direct agency, since
this notion too relies upon the notion intended as a means. In short, DDE*
part-one does not avoid Bennett's objection, Now let's turn to DDE* part-two.
5. DDE* part-two: Opportunistic and Eliminative Agency
Recall that DDE* part-two says:
DDE* part-two: opportunisitic harmful direct agency is morally
worse than eliminative harmful direct agency.
Quinn's reasons for thinking a second part to DDE* is needed will be clearer if
we start by considering another pair of cases.
HYSTERECTOMY: A pregnant woman will die unless her
cancerous uterus is removed. If the operation is performed,
given the limits of medical technology, the fetus will die. If the
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operation is not performed, the woman will give birth to a
healthy infant but will not survive the birth,
CRANIOTOMY: A pregnant woman will die unless the fetus she
is delivering is removed from her body immediately and
removing it immediately requires crushing its skull. There is
another way to remove the fetus which will allow the fetus to
live, but involves allowing the woman to die.
Quinn notes that there seems to be a much more pronounced moral
gap between the terror bomber and strategic bomber cases than there is
between CRANIOTOMY and HYSTERECTOMY. By this he means that he
thinks we find CRANIOTOMY in some way morally worse than
HYSTERECTOMY and we find the terror bomber case in some way morally
worse than the strategic bomber case, but the moral gap between the bombers
is bigger than the moral gap between the surgeons, 16
I should point out that intuitions regarding the surgery pair of cases are
much less uniform than intuitions on the bomber cases. Also, as Quinn
acknowledges, there are many features complicating the second pair of cases,
for example, that the fetus is threatening the woman's life and that fetus is
not yet a person and thus whether it has the same moral standing as the
woman is extremely unclear. So it is no surprise that even those who do see a
moral difference between CRANIOTOMY and HYSTERECTOMY are apt to
find the difference less striking here than in the case of the bombers. Though
16 By speaking of one case as morally worse than another, I am avoiding a question about whether it is
the action of one agent that is morally worse than the action of the other agent or whether the actions
are morally on a par but one agent is more blameworthy than the other. I avoid this issue on purpose
because I am appealing to intuition and I think intuition is not this fine-grained; rather our intuitions
about the cases are responses to the whole situation.
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Quinn acknowledges that such features may be responsible for the asymmetry
in people's intuitions about the bombers versus the surgeons, he also
maintains that the asymmetry may be explained by DDE* part-two.
Let's return to the asymmetry in intuitions. Perhaps the following
chart will make Quinn's point clear.




Morally STRATEGIC BOMBER HYSTERECTOMY
Better
On the chart, the gap between the two bomber cases is larger than the
gap between the surgeon cases, This is supposed to represent a larger moral
difference between TERROR BOMBER and STRATEGIC BOMBER is greater than
between CRANIOTOMY and HYSTERECTOMY. Quinn suggests that this
asymmetry shows a need for more line-drawing. He writes;
We have not yet defined the difference between the more
pronounced moral asymmetry of... SB and TB [ STRATEGIC
BOMBER and TERROR BOMBER ], and the apparently weaker
asymmetry of HC and CC [HYSTERECTOMYand CRANIOTOMY]. This
difference may partly depend on whether the agent, in his
strategy sees the victim as an advantage or as a difficulty. In CC
the doctor wants the fetus removed... Its presence there is the
problem. Perhaps it would not be surprising if we regarded fatal
or harmful exploitation as more difficult to justify than fatal or
harmful elimination. If so, we might say that the doctrine
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discriminates against direct agency that benefits from the presence
of the victim (direct opportunistic agency) and more weakly
discriminates against direct agency that aims to remove an
obstacle or difficulty that the victim presents (direct eliminative
agency). "17
So harmful direct agency is opportunistic if and only if the agent views
the victim (or the victim's presence) as a benefit, And harmful direct agency
is eliminative if and only if the agent views the victim (or the victim's
presence) as an obstacle. 18 But questions remain. For example: Is the
distinction between opportunistic and eliminative agency exhaustive? Quinn
says the asymmetrical judgments "may partly depend on whether the agent...
sees the victim as an advantage or as a difficulty." This suggests an exhaustive
division, but it's fairly weak evidence. Does an agent who involves another
in a plan always view that other as either an advantage or a difficulty? Also,
could one person view another as presenting both an obstacle and a benefit at
once (with regard to the same plan)? I'll assume the two categories are
mutually exclusive and the division exhaustive.
Also, we might wonder: how are we to understand eliminative direct
agency? After all, Quinn tells us that in cases of direct agency, the agent
deliberately involves the victim in something in order to further his purpose
precisely by way of their being so involved." It sounds as though a feature of
any case of direct agency is the expectation of the agent to benefit from the
presence of the victim, since the agent involves the victim in order to further
his plan. For agency to be both direct and eliminative, the agent must both
deliberately involve the victim in a plan in order to further some purpose
17Quinn, p. 344
181 have made out these notions by appeal to the agent's view of the victim. This may not be evident
from the quotation since Quinn says: "agency which benefits from..." But elsewhere Quinn focuses on the
difference in how the agent views the victim.
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and at the same time view the victim as presenting an obstacle. Perhaps we
can best see what Quinn has in mind by considering CRANIOTOMY since he
tells us this is a case of eliminative agency.
In CRANIOTOMY the surgeon does view the fetus as an obstacle and she
also does deliberately involve the fetus in her plan. But she does not benefit
from the presence of the fetus since her whole plan just is to eliminate it.
Perhaps the following works as a test for eliminative agency:
Harmful Direct Agency is eliminative if and only if the agent's
end is achieved by the victim's going out of existence.
If the fetus were to suddenly go out of existence, the surgeon's end would be
achieved. However, consider this variant of CRANIOTOMY.
CRANIOTOMY TWO; A pregnant woman with a cancerous uterus
will die unless both the fetus and the tumor are removed from
her body immediately. The only way to save the woman is for
the surgeon to first remove the fetus, by crushing its skull, and
then remove the tumor.
CRANITIOMY TWO is surely still a case of eliminative agency, rather
than opportunistic. The only difference between the cases is the addition of
the tumor; the surgeon's attitude toward the patient hasn't changed. But the
above account of eliminative agency misses this case; it misses it simply
because the surgeon must do more than remove the fetus in order to
accomplish her end. Perhaps then the following revised account of
eliminative agency is more plausible:
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Harmful Direct Agency is eliminative if and only if the agent's
goal is either advanced or achieved by the victim's going out of
existence.
This new account is sufficiently weakened to capture CRANIOTOMY
TWO. Let's assume that this account captures all the cases of eliminative
agency. Does it exclude all cases of opportunistic agency? It will exclude most
of them, and I think that the account captures the spirit of the distinction,
Unfortunately however, there is a certain class of cases it seems to misclassify.
TERROR BOMBER falls into this category. The terror bomber views the
civilians as providing a benefit, not an obstacle. This is surely supposed to be a
case of opportunistic agency. But the civilians provide a benefit precisely
because their presence allows him to kill them, and thus to cause terror.
Notice that if the civilians were to go out of existence, the terror bomber's
goal might well be advanced. One might try to patch up the criterion in the
following way:
Harmful Direct Agency is eliminative if and only if the agent's
goal is advanced or achieved by the victim's going out of
existence before the agent acts.
This last qualification is meant to help in cases like TERROR BOMBER. If
civilians were to go out of existence before the terror bomber even began his
raid, then their going out of existence would not advance his plan. But even
this formulation would need to be modified. To see why, assume that the
relevant action of the terror bomber's is dropping a bomb. If, just as the terror
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bomber flies overhead but before he releases a bomb, civilians go out of
existence, the enemy may believe that the bomber is responsible for the
disappearance of the civilians (perhaps via some new very powerful sort of
bomb) and so the enemy may still be terrorized.
I think rather than adjust the criterion above to accomodate such cases,
we should consider the following question: Both the terror bomber's and the
surgeon's goals are advanced by their victims going out of existence. What
then makes one's agency opportunistic and the other eliminative? In
answering this, I think we ultimately circle back to where we started: the
surgeon sees the fetus as an obstacle while the terror bomber sees the civilians
as providing a benefit. So in the remainder of the discussion I will stick with
Quinn's way of making out the distinction, though it is somewhat imprecise.
We have been considering the difference between opportunistic and
eliminative agency. But all of this is by way of examining the second part of
DDE*. We might put DDE* part-two as follows:
DDE* part-two: opportunistic harmful direct agency is morally worse
than eliminative harmful direct agency.
DDE* part-two is supposed to capture the asymmetry in the cases above as
follows. In HYSTERECTOMY, the fetus is harmed by way of indirect agency
whereas in CRANIOTOMY, it is harmed by way of eliminative direct agency. So
we have a case of eliminative direct agency contrasted with a case of indirect
agency. With the bombers, we have a case of opportunistic direct harmful
agency (TERROR BOMBER) contrasted with a case of harmful indirect agency
(STRATEGIC BOMBER). Below is a revised version of the Chart of Harmful
Agency which includes Quinn's categories of Harmful Agency.
81
Chart of Harmful Agency




Indirect Agency STRATEGIC BOMBER HYSTERECTOMY
This difference, according to Quinn, may explain the asymmetry in our
moral judgements of the cases. We should expect DDE* to discriminate
strongly in favor of the strategic bomber. And since the second pair of cases
contrasts an instance of eliminative harmful direct agency (CRANIOTOMY)
with one of harmful indirect agency (HYSTERECTOMY), we should expect DDE*
to discriminate in favor of HYSTERECTOMY, but only weakly.
But now I want to turn to two paired cases which I think cause trouble
for DDE* part-two. The first pair involves trolleys, the second, politicians.
6. Objections to DDE* part-two
To see the trolley cases, we need to start with Philippa Foot's well-
known problem of the runaway trolley. The problem is this:
TROLLEY: A driver of a runaway trolley sees he is headed for
five people who are trapped on a narrow track ahead. There is a
side-track to the left, but there is a person trapped there as well,
There is no way for any of these people to escape, so if the train
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goes straight, five will be killed. If he steers the train to the left-
hand track, one will be killed.
And the second case:
TRANSPLANT: A surgeon has just been brought five accident
victims, each with serious damage to a different vital organ. All are in
imminent danger; the surgeon's only hope of saving the five is to cut
up a healthy patient who is in for a routine physical and distribute the
organs to the five in need. We are to assume that the surgeon is highly
skilled and success is certain.
In each case, the agent must choose between the lives of five and the
life of one. Most people strongly believe that the trolley driver may turn the
trolley to the left, causing the death of one rather than five, but that the
surgeon may not cut up the healthy person to save her five. The problem is to
say why the trolley driver may turn his trolley, killing one, but the surgeon
may not operate, killing one.
So far, DDE* can offer an explanation. If the surgeon were to cut up the
one against his will, her agency would be direct and opportunistic whereas if
the trolley driver turns his trolley to the left, his agency is indirect. To see this,
we need to appeal to conditions (i')-(iii) (p. 65). I'll start with TRANSPLANT.
Condition (i') is met: the doctor harms the healthy person and foresees she
will. (ii) is met as well. The surgeon deliberately involves the healthy patient
in a plan. The relevant counterfactual test question is this: "If you had
believed that the healthy patient would not be involved in the operation,
would you have altered your plans?" It is an awkward question; it's awkward
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to imagine the surgeon thinking over whether she would operate if the
victim were not to be involved in the operation! While the question is
awkward, I think it is clear that the surgeon's plan is completely dependent
upon her belief that the patient will be involved. The surgeon would answer
Yes.
Condition (iii) is met too, The harm which results to the victim is
certainly a result of the surgeon's deliberate involvement of the victim in her
plan. So this is a case of harmful direct agency. Furthermore, it is
opportunistic agency. The surgeon views the victim as a benefit since without
him she would be unable to achieve her end,
Now let's turn to TROLLEY. As I said above, I think this is a case of
harmful indirect agency. If the driver turns the trolley, he harms the one on
the track, 19 But does the agent, the driver, deliberately involve the victim in
his plan? I think he does not. Again, let's turn to a counterfactual test
question: "If you had believed that the person on the left-hand track would
not be involved in any way by your turning the train, would you have alter,:d
your plans?" The driver would answer No, He, like the strategic bomber,
would be happy to hear that the victim would not be involved. Notice that
his agency is like the strategic bomber's in that (1), unlike the terror bomber,
his end is not jeopardized by the victim going out of existence and (2), unlike
the craniotomy surgeon, his end is not achieved by the victim going out of
existence. So the presence of the person on the left-hand track is incidental to
his plan just as the presence of the civilians is incidental to the plan of the
strategic bomber.
190ne might claim that the driver does not cause the harm; the out of control trolley does, But surely
the driver's turning the trolley left is a cause of the harm, Notice that if no one were on the track
straight ahead and the driver still turned the trolley left onto one, we would not hesitate to attribute
agency to him,
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Now to the problem case, There is a variant on the trolley case which I
think causes problems for Quinn. In the variant case, introduced by Judith
Jarvis Thomson, the trolley tracks no longer simply diverge,
LOOP TROLLEY: As in TROLLEY, the driver of a runaway trolley
faces a choice of allowing the trolley to go straight ahead where
five are trapped on the tracks or to turn the trolley to the left
where one is trapped. But here, the the left-hand and right-hand
track curve around to form a loop, so if the trolley driver does
nothing, the trolley will continue straight ahead, killing the five
on the tracks and coming to a stop before rounding the bend to
the one. If the driver turns the train to the left, the one will be
killed, but because the one is large, his body will stop the train
from continuing around the loop and hitting the five.
If the driver turns the trolley to the left, his agency will be
opportunistic harmful direct agency. He foresees that the one on the left-hand
track will be harmed. But does the driver deliberately involve the one in a
plan? It seems that he does. Again, let's appeal to a counterfactual test
question: "If you had believed that the person on the left-hand track would
not be involved if you turned the trolley, would you have altered your
plans?" If the driver believed that the one on the left-hand track would not be
involved, or effected, by his turning the trolley, then he would alter his plans.
He turns the trolley to the left because he sees a way to stop it from hitting
five. If he were to come to believe that the person in the left would no way be
involved, then he would no longer plan to turn his trolley left, so he would
alter his plans. This shows the driver intentionally involves the one on the
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left in his plan. Furthermore, conditions (iii) is met. The harm to the one on
the left comes about as a result of the driver involving him in a plan. So Loop
TROLLEY is a case of harmful direct agency.
LOOP TROLLEY causes problems for DDE, so if it causes problems for
DDE*, this at least is not a strike in favor of DDE. Still, given Quinn's two-tier
distinction, we might have thought that LOOP TROLLEY would at least fall
into the eliminative rather than opportunistic category. It does not, The
driver in LOOP TROLLEY views the one on the tracks much the way the
surgeon in TRANSPLANT views her victim. The one provides a benefit, an
opportunity for the driver to save the five. So LOOP TROLLEY counts as
opportunistic agency. If the one the left hand track were to suddenly vanish,
the driver's end would not be achieved, and in fact, he would be unable to
achieve his end. DDE* puts these two cases far apart-it likens the gap between
them to that between the two bombers, not to that between the two surgeons.
This case presents a problem for Quinn because many people think that
the driver may turn his trolley left in both TROLLEY and in LOOP TROLLEY,
yet according to DDE*, the driver's agency in LOOP TROLLEY is morally
worse than the driver's agency in TROLLEY. 20 There may of course be those
who distinguish two types of drivers in loop cases: the drivers who were
going to turn left anyway (in spite of the presence of the one) and the drivers
who turn left because of the one. I take it that Thomson meant for the driver
in her LOOP TROLLEY example to be of the second kind and again, I take it
that many people have the intuition that the driver may still turn his trolley
20This pair of cases also speaks against DDE* (part-one & part-two), DDE* puts the moral gap
between these two cases on a par with the gap between the bombers not the gap between the surgeons,
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(and that the driver does not do something morally worse in this case than in
the original trolley case).2 1
While I think that this pair of cases causes trouble for Quinn,
intuitions on these cases are not uniform--some people believe that what the
driver in LOOP TROLLEY does is morally worse, 22 While this is not an
intuition I share, I think this pair of cases is especially troublesome--it's hard
to know what to say about it. So I will turn to a final pair of cases, which I
think causes a more clearcut problem for DDE*.
The following cases require us to imagine that it is once again election
time. Consider these politicians:
Max, a young, inexperienced candidate aims to get elected to
Congress. He knows that Lois, a liberal senator from another
district, is particularly disliked by the more conservative people
of his district. He believes that he can get himself reelected by
discrediting Lois. To discredit her, he claims that she is
supporting a crazy economic plan. His scheme works and he is
elected by his district while she is not by hers.
This is a case of harmful direct opportunistic agency. I think it is clear
that Max harms Lois's interests, 23 Max deliberately involves Lois in his plan.
If Max were to come to believe that his plan did not involve Lois, he would
211 mention this because one might hold the view that it is permissible for each driver to turn his
trolley but still hold that the driver's agency in Loop Trolley is worse. Such moral intuitions might not
be problematic for Quinn since DDE* says nothing about permissibility.
22 For example, Michael J. Costa, (1987).
23The DDE is often applied to grave cases of harm -- like death or bodily injury. I assume this sort of
harm--harm to one's interests--does count. I suspect that if this is not right, cases can be concocted
which would make the same point and would count as cases of harm.
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alter his plans. Furthermore, the harm comes to Lois by way of this
involvement. Finally, Max sees Lois as presenting a benefit; he does not see
her as an obstacle. Her existence or presence gives presents him with an
opportunity to achieve his goal,
Now on to the second case:
Fred has political aspirations. He longs to represent his district in
Congress. But Lois has held the seat Fred wants for years and
years. Fred decides that it's high time to discredit Lois so that he
hiniself can be elected. He devises a hair brained economics
scheme and runs a series of ads in which he says that Lois
supports this scheme. As a result of these ads, Lois is not re-
elected.
Fred's agency, like Max's is of the harmful direct variety, Furthermore,
Fred deliberately involves her in a plan of his. If he were to come to think his
plan would not involve Lois, he would alter it. Finally, the harm which
comes to Lois comes by way of her involvement in this plan. She is not re-
elected because of Fred's scheme. But this case, unlike the previous one, is a
case of eliminative direct agency, not opportunistic agency. Fred, after all, sees
Lois as an obstacle not as presenting a benefit.
DDE* will discriminate against both of these cases, but it will
discriminate more weakly against Fred's agency, since it is only eliminative
harmful direct agency, not opportunistic agency. However, I cannot find any
intuitive basis for thinking that Max's agency is morally worse than Fred's.
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If we reject DDE* part-two, what are we to say about the asymmetry
between the bombers on the one hand and the surgeons on the other? I think
there is much we can say to explain the asymmetry. It may be traceable, for
example, to a doubt about whether the fetus has rights (we have no such
doubts about the civilians in STRATEGIC BOMBER), or perhaps we think
that the doctor may feel a more sincere sort of remorse than the bomber,
These cases, I believe, suggest that Quinn is wrong to think that the
distinction between opportunistic and eliminative agency tracks our
intuitions.
7. Review of Fischer, Ravizza, Copp
In a recent paper, John Fischer, Mark Ravizza, and David Copp appear
to make much trouble for DDE*. However, I think they focus on many cases
which are not in fact problematic for Quinn and do not focus on the real
problem for Quinn. As I have already noted, at least some of their objections
depend upon what I think is a mistaken, or at least uncharitable reading of
Quinn. The real problem, I think, is that Quinn has motivated the
introduction of his distinction by saying it gets around Bennett's objection--
and it doesn't. If Bennett's objection stands, DDE and DDE* are both in
trouble. Still, if DDE* can be defended against the objections of Fischer et al,
then it is at least left roughly on a par with DDE. On the other hand, if Fischer
et al are right, then DDE* does a much worse job than DDE of dividing up
paired cases in a way which matches intuitions. I want to argue that Fischer et
al are wrong. I will be suggesting that most of their objections rest on a
misinterpretation of Quinn and that the remainder of their objections are
simply mistaken.
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The objections raised by Fischer et al fall into three types. I will give a
sample of each type of objection and say how in each case I think DDE* can be
defended. The first type of objection exploits Quinn's failure to make explicit
that DDE* is restricted to cases involving foreseen harms. Of the objections
presented, it is the ones in this group which initially appear most devastating.
Here's one of their examples;
... Jack plans to ask Mary out for a date. He knows Mary will be in
a certain area of the library at a particular time. Just before that
time, Jack sees Sam there. He realizes he would feel awkward if
Sam were sitting there while he asked Mary for the date..,.. In
order to persuade Sam to got to the coffee house, he tells Sam a
concocted story about some music being played there,... Sam
takes the bait and drives toward the coffeehouse. Unfortunately,
as Sam is proceeding toward the coffee-house, he is involved in
an accident with a drunken driver and is killed. 24
Fischer et al claim that this qualifies as a case of harmful direct agency
since harm does come to Sam as a result of Jack's deliberately involving him
in something in order to further his own purpose. But, they claim, Sam is not
"the sort of agent to which the DDE is allegedly applicable". DDE (and
presumably DDE*) is usually taken to apply to pairs of cases. But let's put this
aside. We can still understand Fischer et al's claim that this case causes
trouble for DDE*. But this case exploits Quinn's failure to make explicit that
DDE* applies only to cases of foreseen harm. Jack does not foresee that Sam
will be harmed on his way to the coffee-house. On my interpretation of DDE*,
what Jack does fails to satisfy the conditions for either harmful direct agency
or harmful indirect agency since the case fails to meet condition (i') (p. 65)
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24Fischer et al, p. 712
That is not to say Jack does nothing wrong, but simply that DDE* does not
apply.
Fischer et al acknowledge that Quinn probably did intend for DDE* to
be restricted to foreseen harms. They write:
It may seem that it would be more charitable to amend Quinn's
formulation in light of what he says at the beginning of his
paper, in footnote 3. There he says that the doctrine of double
effect states necessary conditions of the permissibility of doing
something when one foresees a bad upshot. Indeed it is
reasonable to think that Quinn wishes his explicit formulation,
which he develops in the text of his paper, to be embedded
within a set of presuppositions which includes the constraint
that the agent foresees the relevant bad upshot. 25
Fischer et al go on to claim that even if we interpret Quinn in this
more charitable way (were we assume DDE* applies only to cases involving
foreseen harm), DDE* is implausible. Here is an example of the second type of
objection they raise. We are to assume (from a previous case) that Jack (not
Bill) has sent Sam to the coffee house.
Bill can be taken to foresee with high probability that Sam will be
killed. He expects Sam to be killed in an accident with a drunk
driver. But just in case Sam avoids this fate, Bill drives to the
parking lot [of the coffee house] with the intention of killing
Sam, if Sam miraculously avoids the drunken drivers. Suppose
further that just before Bill would have been called upon to
finish him off, Sam is distracted by Bill's flashy car and [swerves
over some railroad tracks where he is run over by a train and
dies.]26
25Fischer et al, p. 715
26Fischer et al, p. 716 (I have altered the case in minor ways in the interest of simplicity.)
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Of this case they write: "Bill's agency is intuitively a paradigm case of direct
agency; he is tugged and guided by evil... And yet Quinn's account must
classify Bill's agency as indirect."
On my understanding of HDA, this is not harmful agency at all--it's
neither direct nor indirect harmful agency, Here too condition (i') simply is
not met. Bill does not harm Sam,2 7
We come now to the third sort of objection. Fischer et al claim that the
previous objections were meant to show DDE* is descriptively inadequate.
Now they offer two objections meant to show DDE* to be normatively
inadequate; I will consider both of these objections. The objections revolve
around cases of bomb removal. Each of the objections involves a pair of cases
in which either DDE* makes a normative discrimination that intuition
doesn't make, Here is a simplified version of their first case:
BOMB REMOVER 1: On a table in the library are two boxes: a red
box containing valuable books and a black box containing a
bomb, In order to save the books, we ask Mary, who knows
nothing of the situation, to take a steel case to the library and to
put the red box (containing the books) into the steel case. We
foresee the likelihood of Mary's death since we know that the
bomb is sensitive to movement. Mary complies; the books are
saved and she is killed in the explosion. 28
According to Fischer et al, this is a case of harmful direct agency. They write:
"We foresee a harm to Mary, and the harm comes about, It comes about partly
as a result of our involving her in removing the black box in order to further
our purpose of saving the books..." Now here is the second case:
2 7Notice that even if one opts for an interpretation of harmful direct and indirect agency that
substitutes something weaker for my (i'), this case is unlikely to count as harmful agency at all.
2 8This is a simplified version of Fischer et al's Bomb Remover 1, p. 717. The changes I have made do
not affect my point,
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BOMB REMOVER 2: On a table in the library are two boxes: a
red box containing valuable books and a black box containing a
bomb.In order to save the books, we ask Mary, who knows
nothing of the situation, to take a steel case to the library and to
put the red box (containing the books) into the steel case. We
foresee the likelihood of Mary's death since we know that the
bomb is sensitive to movement. On her way to the library, Mary
forgets what she is supposed to do. She picks up the black box
and carries it away with her, The bomb goes off, killing her. The
books are saved.29
Fischer et al claim that this is a case of indirect agency, quoting Quinn's
original definition. They write: "we foresee a harm to Mary, and the harm
comes about. We intend to involve her in something 'in order to further
[our] purpose precisely by way of [her] being so involved.' But 'what is so
intended does not contribute to [her] harm,' for what is so intended is that she
put the [red] box in the case and that does not happen. Since it does not
happen it cannot play a causal role in contributing to her harm." They note
that while one might claim that since Mary does do something which
prevents damage to the vermilion box, perhaps this is close enough to count
as what was intended for her. But this puts us 'back in the game of
distinguishing intentions and ascertaining "closeness". Notice though that
the issue of closeness in a different place here. In CITY BOMBER, the issue of
closeness arose with regard to whether the bomber intended to involve the
civilians. Now it arises with regard to whether what is intended is what
contributed to harm. (On my interpretation of Quinn, CITY BOMBER raises
an issue of closeness around condition (ii), whereas this case raises the issue
for condition (iii) (see page 65) ).
29This is a simplified version of Fischer et al's Bomb Remover 2 p. 718. The changes I have made do
not affect my point.
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According to DDE* (part-one), the first case of agency is morally worse
and thus harder to justify than the second. 30 Fischer et al write: "Apparently,
on Quinn's account [Mary's] mistake makes our action more easily justifiable,
which seems implausible." I agree that this seems implausible. Further, I
agree that this case is troublesome for DDE*. What should be said in defense
of DDE* is that like cases can be created to cause trouble for DDE. Wherever
the problem for DDE* resolves around what exactly is intended, one can
concoct parallel problems for DDE.
The final pair of problem cases contrasts BOMB REMOVER 1 with the
following case:
BOMB REMOVER 3: At one end of the library is a table at which
Mary works. At the other end of the library is a table on which
are scattered valuable books. Also on the table with the books is a
a black box containing a bomb. The bomb is on a timer and will
blow up, we realize, in a matter of minutes. We grab the black
box (containing the bomb) and carry it quickly to Mary's side of
the library, where we gingerly place it on the table at which Mary
is working. We run from the scene, leaving Mary to her fate and
realizing that there is an extremely high probability of her death.
The books are saved. Mary is killed when the bomb blows up. 31
Fischer et al compare this case and BOMB REMOVER1 in the last of their
objections I will consider. They claim that BOMB REMOVER3 is a case of
harmful direct agency, while BOMB REMOVER1 is a case of harmful indirect
agency. Yet in each case the mix of good and bad effects is the same; in each
case, Mary's is killed and in each case the books are saved. Quinn is
30DDE is usually qualified to apply only to cases where the harm brought about as a means is less than
(or perhaps equal to) the good brought about as an end. DDE* might be so modified. I discuss this
further after introducing the final objection.
31This is a slightly altered version of Fischer et al's Blomb Remover 3, p. 719.
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apparently committed to the view that the what is done in BOMB
REMOVER3 is more easily justified and this is implausible.
The first thing to note is that application of DDE (the original doctrine)
is usually restricted to cases in which the harm brought about as a means or
side effect is outweighed ,or at the very least matched, by the good end, so
DDE would not normally be applied here at all. Second, BOMB REMOVER3
does not point to a special problem with DDE* as opposed to DDE. Rather, it
raises a question about how best to formulate the doctrine (whether the
original version or Quinn's). . Quinn could add the same sort of qualification
to DDE*. However, there are two ways one might qualify the doctrine to
account for proportionality and only one will help. Let's look at the two ways
of qualifying the doctrine.
One might hold the following view:" For any two cases which are alike
except that one involves direct agency and the other indirect, the first case is
morally worse. But (here's the qualification) neither case is permissible unless
the relevant proportionality requirement is met." Notice that this still
commits one to the view that the agency in BOMB REMOVER 1 is morally
worse than that in BOMB REMOVER 3, which I think is an undesirable
commitment.
The second way to include the qualification is to state DDE* (or DDE) as
follows: "It is sometimes permissible to bring about a harm by indirect agency
which it would not be permissible to bring about by direct agency." The
"sometimes" would then get filled out to include the proportionality
requirement. This formulation does not commit one to the view that the
agency in BOMB REMOVER 1 is morally worse than that in BOMB
REMOVER 3. It leaves open the view that direct agency makes for moral
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worseness only if the proportionality requirement (and perhaps other
conditions) are met first,32
If DDE is stated so as to entail that for any two cases alike except that
one involves an intended harm and the other a merely foreseen harm, the
former is morally worse, than I believe objections similar to the bomb cases
can be found. On the other hand, DDE and DDE* can avoid such objections
depending upon how they are qualified.
8. Summary
We have been looking at Quinn's replacement principle for DDE
because it promised to do the normative work of DDE while escaping the
serious problem raised by Bennett which I discuss in Chapter 2. Recall that
the replacement principle was supposed to get around Bennett's objection
and do a better job than the original principle at explaining certain
asymmetries. I think DDE* does not correctly explain the asymmetries, since I
think opportunistic agency is not morally worse than eliminative agency. So I
think we should reject part-two of DDE*, I have left open whether or not
DDE* (part-one) might have advantages over DDE. I have argued that as long
as we interpret Quinn charitably, we need not see DDE* as being subject to the
criticisms made by Fischer et al. On the other hand, DDE* does not have a
couple of the key advantages Quinn suggested it to have. Most importantly
for my purposes it does not get around Bennett's objection. So I will return in
the next chapter to DDE and see if it can't be defended against Bennett's
challenge after all.
3 2 Presumably one could qualify the doctrine in this way without bringing in permissibility. On this
formulation the moral worseness of intending harm over foreseeing it holds only once the




Refutation of Bennett's Challenge
1. Introduction
DDE* was of interest because of Quinn's claim that it got around
Bennett's objection. In the previous chapter we saw that it in fact does not
escape Bennett's objection. In this chapter I take another look at Bennett's
objection and argue that we can block his reductio after all.
In Chapter 2, we looked at an argument that went as follows:
(1) If feature F is a conjunction of features G and H, you don't
intend to produce an F unless you intend to produce a G
and intend to produce an H.
(2') Killing the civilians involves making their bodies
inoperative for a while and making their bodies
inoperative thereafter,
(3') The terror bomber does not intend to produce an event
with the feature civilians inoperative after the war.
(C') Therefore, the terror bomber does not intend to kill the
civilians.
Let's begin by reexamining (3'). Why think (3') is true? In chapter 2, I
claimed that (3') of Bennett's argument relies upon the counterfactual test
question. Bennett assumes that the terror bomber does not intend to produce
civilian inoperativeness after the war since the bomber would have been no
less motivated to bomb had he believed the civilians would not remain
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inoperative. So Bennett assumes that an agent who answers the question "If
you had believed there would be no G as a result of your A-ing would you
have been less likely to A?" negatively does not intend to bring about a G. I
think Bennett is wrong to make this assumption. In the following section I
will argue that this assumption is wrong because it does not take into account
the possibility of 'preemption',
2. The Problem of Preemption
Bennett assumes that a negative answer to the question shows that the
agent is not motivated by the expectation of a G and thus does not intend to
produce a G. But this does not follow. Bennett's counterfactual test question
does not allow us to distinguish whether the agent answers the question
negatively because she is unmotivated by the expectation of a G or whether
the agent answers the question negatively because although she is motivated
by the expectation of a G, she thinks in the absence of a G something else will
bring about her end. The difference is important. I will be arguing that in the
first case the agent does not intend to bring about a G as a means to her end
and that in the second case she does intend to bring about a G as a means to
her end, and that the counterfactual test does not make this important
distinction. First though I want to offer an example which should help to
illustrate the problem with the test question, Consider the following:
HOUSEBUILDER: Marge has decided to please Frank by building
him a house, Frank is away for six months and Marge, being an
exceptionally efficient carpenter, is certain she can finish the
framing and the facades before he returns if she works on it every
day. She believes that when Frank returns and sees the
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completed facades of the house, he will be pleased. She also
thinks that if she were to finish only the framing during Frank's
absence, so that upon his return he would see the framing but
not the facades, he would be equally pleased. Finally, she realizes
that if she were not to have even the framing done, then Frank
would not be pleased. So if she thought that she couldn't
complete the framing in a six-month period, she wouldn't
undertake the project at all. Still, she believes that she will be able
to complete not only the framing but the facades as well by the
time Frank returns.
Here's why this case makes trouble for Bennett's test. If Marge had
believed that she would not be able to finish the facades, she would not have
been less likely to undertake the project. But this, according to Bennett, means
that she doesn't intend to finish the facades. I think it is clear that Marge does
intend to finish the facades. She plans to finish both the framing and the
facades by the time Frank returns, If someone asks Marge why she is working
so hard on the house, she will respond "in order to have the framing and
facades finished by the time Frank returns."
According to Bennett's view, the relevant question in this case is: "If
you believed you would not finish the facades by the time Frank returns,
would you be less likely to go ahead?" Assuming Marge answers No, we will
not be able to distinguish whether she answers No to the question because (1)
she thinks that the finished facades play im £el in bringing about Frank's
happiness (they are merely a side effect of her activity) or (2) although she
thinks the finished facades will play a role in bringing about her end, she also
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thinks that in their absence, something else would bring about Frank's
happiness.
Consider line 1 in the diagram below. Line 1 is meant to illustrate a
case in which an agent expects an action of type A to produce events of type F
and G, which in turn are expected to produce an event of type H, The
'counterfactual' column indicates that the agent further believes that if no
event of type G were to occur, her end, an event of type E, would still be
brought about via an H. Notice that in line 1, the E is shown as coming about
via an H in both columns; that is, whether or not a G occurs, an H occurs and
brings about an E.
actual (a G occurs) counterfactual (no G)
line 1 A-> F&G-> H -> E A-> F-> H -> E
line 2 A-> F&G-> H -> E A-> F-> J -> E
Now turn to line 2. It is just like line 1 under the actual column but differs in
the counterfactual column. Line 2 shows that if no G were to occur, an E
would be brought about by a j, not an H. This is supposed to represent
preemption. Whether or not a J occurs depends upon whether a G occurs. In
the absence of a G, a J occurs. But if a G occurs, it preempts the J. (In this case
the dependence is asymmetrical. Whether a G occurs does not depend on
whether a J does). In HOUSEBUILDER, finishing the facades preempts
Frank's seeing the framing. So HOUSEBUILDER is best represented by line 2
while STRATEGIC BOMBER is best represented by line 19 The strategic
bomber thinks that whether his raid results in any deaths or not, it is the
shortage of weapons which will bring down enemy morale.
My view is that in line 2 sort of case, the agent intends to bring about
an F and G as a means, whereas in a line 1 sort of case, the agent does not
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intend to bring about a G as a means. I support this by pointing out that only
in line 1 does the agent expect her end to be brought about in the same way,
whether or not a G occurs, The route to an E shown under the counterfactual
column of line 2 involves a potential alternate means (a J); not an actual
means. In HOUSEBUILDER, Marge would intend to bring about an E via a J if
her beliefs were different than they actually are. But as things are, she does
not intend to bring about an E via a J. But others may disagree with me. They
might point out that in both cases the agent takes the production of a G to be
incidental to the achievement of her end. After all, the agent thinks that her
end would be achieved by A-ing, whether or not a G occurs. So the agent
thinks that achieving her end does not depend upon producing a G. And
surely this provides strong reason to see the production of the G as
unintended, as merely foreseen. I call their view 'the Ahistorical View'. This
views says:
Ahistorical Yiew: If an agent is no less motivated to A given
the counterfactual belief that A-ing produces no G, then she
does not intend to produce a G by A-ing.
The Ahistorical View is implausible; it is implausible because it assigns
to agents intentions which conflict with beliefs. HOUSEBUILDER provides an
example of the problem. To see the point we need to consider the case in a
little more detail.
Potential Alternate Means-End Route
work every finish Frank sees Frank is
day for 6 mo. framing framing happy
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Actual Means-End Route
work every __ finish Frank sees Frank isfi---Ib
day for 6 mo. facades facades happy
Marge has the following beliefs (as suggested by the diagram): She
believes that if she finishes the framing and facades, then it Frank's seeing the
facades which will make Frank happy. Furthermore she believes that she will
finish the facades. Now recall that according to the counterfactual test, Marge
intends to complete only the framing. So if we accept that Marge intends to
finish the framing only as a means to making Frank happy, then we are left
assuming Marge (1) intends to make Frank happy by finishing the framing
and not by finishing the facades and (2) believes that he will not see the
framing, but will see the facades. Thus it leaves her intending to bring about
her end by bringing about a means (in this case Frank's seeing the framing)
which she does not expect to occur. I think this gives us a strong reason to
reject the Ahistorical View.
Philosophers often move from claims about what an agent needs (in
order to bring about her end) to what the agent intends. For example, Warren
Quinn, summarizing Bennett's point, writes: "The terror bomber does
not...need the civilians actually to be dead. He only needs them to be as good
as dead and to seem dead until the war ends,"l But it should now be clear
that such appeals are misleading. It does not follow from an agent's not
needing a G in order to bring about her end that she does not intend to
produce a G as her means to that end. Again, Marge does not need to finish
the facades in order to achieve her end, but it does not follow that she does
1Quinn, "Actions, Intentions and Consequences: The Doctrine of Double Effect", 337.
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not intend to finish them as her means. And more importantly, even if the
terror bomber does not need civilians to die in order to achieve his end, he
may still intend to kill as a means,
I have been arguing that there is a problem with Bennett's
counterfactual test question. How does this bear on Bennett's reductio? The
counterfactual test was supposed to support (3') of Bennett's argument. It was
supposed to support the claim that the terror bomber does not intend to make
civilians inoperative after the war, If I am right that there is a problem with
the counterfactual test question, then this undercuts one line of support for
(3'). But notice it does not show (3') is false. (3') may be supportable on other
grounds. One might defend (3') by appeal to the following plausible principle:
If an agent expects a G to occur only after her end, an E, then
she does not intend to bring about a G as a means to an E.
Since the terror bomber expects the civilian inoperativeness after the war to
occur after the terror, he does not intend to bring it about as a means to the
terror,
While it is important to notice the problem with Bennett's
counterfactual test, the availability of alternate defenses of (3') shows that this
test is not what is doing the work in Bennett's argument. We have been
assuming that (1) and (2') entail the following intermediate conclusion: If one
does not intend to make the civilians inoperative thereafter, one does not
intend to kill them. In chapter 2, I mentioned that Bennett defends his
argument against the response which simply rejects temporal disjunction.
Bennett's reply was that if we disallow temporal disjunction we seem to block
the reasonable conclusion that the politician (in Bennett's example) intends
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to break up the union for only the month of December. Recall that Bennett's
case, which I will henceforth call 'STRIKE' was this;
STRIKE: A political leader takes action against a trade union,
intending to bring about a month-long state of disintegration in
which the various locals break off from the parent body and
severally fall into further disunity. This is his intended means to
the end of the union's being unable to call a strike during
December. He is rightly sure that if the union falls apart for that
long it will never be reconstituted, but all he cares about or
intends is the one-month dissolution: if he were sure that the
union would recover during January and flourish for many
years, that would not reduce his motivation for moving against
it,
Bennett argues that it is reasonable to think that the politician intends to
bring about only a one-month break up of the union. He uses this claim to
defend temporal disjunction, As I noted in Chapter 2, this sort of move is
suspicious even in cases which do not involve irreversible change. Do I
intend to get four hours of cold relief only if I intend to get the first hour of
relief and I intend to get the latter three hours of relief from my cold? Though
I reserve the name 'temporal disjunction' for cases involving permanent
effects (as above), this whole sort of strategy is suspicious and it would be nice
to reject it while maintaining that the politician intends to bring about only a
one-month dissolut an. I think there are grounds for doing so, and I turn to
those in the following section.
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3. A Dilemma
I believe that Bennett's defense of temporal disjunction relies upon an
unclarity in the structure of the relevant cases. Bennett relies heavily on the
STRIKE to motivate his argument. Presumably we are to assume that STRIKE
is similar to TERROR BOMBER in all the relevant ways. But on the most
natural reading of STRIKE, the case's structure differs importantly from the
structure of TERROR BOMBEFr. Consider these lines:
[The politician] is rightly sure that if the union falls apart for that
long [one month] it will never be reconstituted, but all he cares
about is the one-month dissolution....
This suggests that the politician thinks the one-month period of
inoperativeness brings about the inoperativeness thereafter. It implies that if
the union were only disassembled for a day or a week, it would be
reconstituted. The politician also thinks it's the one-month break up that
prevents a strike in December. So he thinks of the one-month break-up as
playing two causal roles; bringing about a permanent dissolution of the union
and preventing the strike. The diagram below depicts this way of
understanding the case. The diagram shows the strike's being averted and the
union being dissolved from January 1 on as flowing from the one-month
dissolution.
Diagram #1
politician takes union dissolved strike
action for December averted
union dissolved
from Jan. 1 on
105
What about TERROR BOMBER? If STRIKE is to be of any help to
Bennett, then it and TERROR BOMBER need to be alike in all the relevant
ways. The relevant bomber case is one something like what is depicted in
Diagram #2.
Diagram #2
bomber civilians inoperative enemy
drops bomb up to time t terrorized
civilians inoperative
from time t on
I believe Bennett faces a dilemma. He can say that Diagram #1 and Diagram
#2 do depict the cases he had in mind or he can deny that the natural reading
of STRIKE is the one he had in mind and claim that the two cases are
structurally alike but not as in the diagrams above. I will be arguing that
Bennett runs into trouble no matter which of these he chooses.
First assume that the cases are as shown in the diagrams above. I said
that a natural reading of STRIKE suggests such a case. But what about
TERROR BOMBER? For a terror bomber case to have this structure we have
to assume that the bomber expects to produce civilian bodily inoperativeness
which is not yet permanent (so not yet death), Why? The condition brought
upon the union (the inoperativeness for December) is a reversible condition.
The union is disassembled but it is physically possible for the union to
reassemble. So, for the cases to be analogous, the bomber needs to assume that
the effect produced on the civilians is reversible. Thus we need to assume
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that the bomb produces inoperativeness which is not death and further, that
the civilians' remaining in this reversible state of inoperativeness for a
certain length of time will bring on an irreversible state of inoperativeness (or
death). We have to assume all this in order for the cases to be parallel (given
that Diagram #1 accurately depicts STRIKE). 2
But an ordinary case of terror bombing is not like this. Most notably, it
is not usually assumed that the bomb brings about inoperativeness which is
not yet death. We need a description of a case which truly parallels STRIKE
(and goes with Diagram #2). I happen to have such a case, but before turning
to it, I need to say a little about stun bombs, Stun bombs, we are to assume, are
a special kind of bomb. People hit by stun bombs typically go into a state of
temporary inoperativeness (they become stunned). The inoperativeness lasts
for a few days. If at this point the victims are treated, they fully recover. If they
are not treated, they die as a result of the inoperativeness. Now consider the
following case:
2 Notice that the problem of preemption arises for the Counterfactual Test Question in cases in which
we are to assume that both effects (the dying and the factory destruction from example) flow from the
agent's action (only in cases which have the second structure). It won't arise if the cases are as shown in
Diagram #1 and #2. It does not arise for cases with the structure shown under the actual column below:
actual if no G
line 3: A -> F-> E A -> F -> E
IV
G
line 4: A-> F->G -> E A-> F
Recall that the problem with the test was that it could not separate when an agent was actually
unmotivated by the belief that A-ing would lead to a G and when she was motivated by this but
believed that in the absence of a G an altemrnate route from the F (see diagram) to her end would occur,
So the trouble comes about when the agent believes that in the presence of a G, an F will bring about an
E by one route and in the absence of a G, an F will bring about an E via an alternate route. In the above
diagrammed case, the second possibility (the alternate route) is ruled out. The reason is because here
an F does occur without a G and it is stipulated then when this happens, the F brings about a G.
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STUN BOMBER: A bomber sees that the enemy is on the brink of
surrendering; he aims to push them over the edge by targeting
civilians in a small village. His plan is to drop stun bombs on the
inhabitants of the village. He is sure that the inoperative bodies
will be found within a day or so and that the enemy will
surrender almost immediately. He would be happy for the
stunned civilians to recover after the surrender. But he also
knows that the enemy is ignorant about stun bombs. So he
knows that the civilians will go untreated and thus will die.
Now we have a case which is parallel in structure to STRIKE. So now
Bennett's point is in order: if we want to maintain that the politician intends
to bring about only a one month break up, we will have to say the same of the
stun bomber--he intends to stun the civilians, but not to kill them.
(Otherwise put, he intends to make them inoperative for a few days). But it
seems to me that this is the right thing to say in the case of the stun bomber--
or at least it is not an absurd thing to say. Stun bombers are not terror
bombers. It is the case of the terror bomber which I said offers the paradigm of
intending to kill as a means. But the stun bomber case is importantly different
from an ordinary case of terror bombing. In making the stun bomber case
parallel to STRIKE we had to assume that the bomb causes inoperativeness
which is not yet death. This assumption is not present in a standard account
of terror bombing. The stun bomber's intending only temporary
inoperativeness does not make trouble for the notion 'intended as a means'.
If Bennett really has a stun bomber in mind, his reductio has lost its force.
That's the first horn of the dilemma, now let's turn to the second horn.
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Bennett might deny that he has cases in mind like those in Diagram #1
and Diagram #2. He might claim that the relevant cases are rather as shown
below.
Diagram #3
politician takes union dissolved strike




bomber civilians inoperative enemy
drops bomb-" up to time t -) terrorized
civilians inoperative
from time t on
Diagram #3 differs from Diagram #1 in that the effect union dissolved from
Jan. 1 on follows directly from the politician's action rather than from the one
month dissolution. Likewise, Diagram #4 differs from Diagram #2 in that the
civilian inoperativeness from time t on follows directly from the bomber's
action and not from the inoperativeness up to time t.
Given that the cases are structured as in Diagram #3 and Diagram #4, I
think it is again open to us once again to reject temporal disjunction. The
terror bomber expects his action to result in civilians dying and the politician
expects his action to result in the union dying. In each case, the agent believes
that something less would do to bring about their end (inoperativeness for a
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while), but that does not show they are not motivated by the expectation of
the relevant death or deaths. Bennett thinks we should be reluctant to
attribute to the politician the intention to kill the union as a means, But if
Bennett means for STRIKE to have be like the Diagram #3 case, then I think
any reluctance we feel to attribute to the politician an intention to kill the
union stems from Bennett's misleading description of the case. As I have
previously noted, Bennett's description of STRIKE strongly suggests a case
more like the one shown in Diagram #1 than the one shown in Diagram #3.
I am rejecting (2') of Bennett's argument but remember that we are
giving Bennett (3'). (3') alone gives Bennett the conclusion that the terror
bomber does not intend to make the civilians inoperative after the war. But
without temporal disjunction, this claim is compatible with the terror
bomber intending to kill the civilians. Likewise, that the politician does not
intend anything for the union in January does not show he does not intend
to kill the union as his means. This case seems to be one of a group of odd
cases. These odd cases involve agents adopting means to their ends which are
'too strong'. Here's an example:
It's very important to you that you sleep for two hours but you are
not at all tired. The only way you can see of getting to sleep is to take a
sleeping pill and the only sleeping pill you have available to you is a
four hour sleeping pill. You take the four hour sleeping pill as your
means to sleeping for two hours.
Do you intend to sleep for hours three and four? Your belief that you
will do so as a result of taking the pill is certainly not what is motivating you.
Whether or not you do, what is clear is this: you do intend to take a four hour
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sleeping pill, You would take a two hour pill if you had one, but you don't, So
you intend to take a four hour pill. This case is not importantly different from
TERROR BOMBER, The terror bomber would drop a stun bomb if he had
one, and bring about terror by stunning. He would bring about terror by doing
something which is reversible (bringing about mere inoperativeness), but he
believes that the only way he can bring about terror (and bring about
inoperative bodies) is by producing an irreversible effect on the civilians, So
he plans to drop a conventional bomb instead. He intends to kill as his means
to creating enemy terror. That the terror bomber does not intend to make
anything the case for the civilians after the war does not show he does not
intend to kill the civilians as his means. To claim otherwise would be like
claiming in the case above that you don't really intend to take a four hour
pill, or like claiming that you don't intend to eat an apple from the bowl
unless you intend to make it the case that the apple not be in the bowl
tomorrow (and that it not be in the bowl the day after, and so on),
That's the second horn, Let me summarize. If Bennett claims that the
cases have the structure shown in Diagrams #1 and #2, then he seems to
have in mind a stun bomber, not a terror bomber and the reductio loses its
force, If Bennett claims that both cases have the structure shown in Diagrams
# 3 and #4, then it is plausible to think that the politician really does intend to
kill the union as his means and that any intuitions to the contrary are due to
Bennett's misleading description of the case,
4. Summary
My purpose in this chapter has been to argue that we can reject
Bennett's reductio. I have suggested that we reject it by rejecting the move to
resolve features of the from 'F forever' into ones of the form 'F for a while'
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and 'F thereafter'. Furthermore, I have stressed that we should also reject his
counterfactual test question, and rough appeals to what an agent needs, as a
indicators of what agents intend as means, Such tests cannot account for
preemption and thus will sometimes indicate not what an agent does intend
but what an agent would intend.
So far I have focused on rejecting challenges to the Ordinary View. I
have not offered any sort of positive account of 'intending as a means'. While
I will not discuss a positive account in any detail, I will briefly sketch some
ideas in this direction in the following chapter.
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Chapter Five
Intending as a Means
1. Introduction
So far I have claimed that what any test for what agents intend as
means needs to pick out agents' actual means, not potential alternate means,
In many respects, I think Bratman's view of intending is satisfactory and I
will suggest below how with the rejection of Bennett's challenge, it may be
defended from the objections I raised earlier.
Bratman relies upon counterfactuals much like the one Bennett offers
in explicating the endeavoring and screening-off roles he claims are
characteristic of intentions, I have said that Bennett's counterfactual test
should be rejected, Where does that leave Bratman's account, or other
accounts which identify intentions mainly with what Bratman considers
endeavoring? I will address this question below.
2. Means Consistency Principle
The following principle offers a plausible constraint on what is
intended as a means:
Means Consistency Principle: If X believes that by A-ing she will
not produce an N, then she does not intend to bring about an N as
a means to her end for which she is A-ing.
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I take it that this principle is uncontroversial. This principle will lead
us away from the Ahistorical View, Bennett's counterfactual test gave results
which conflicted with this principle. But perhaps a revised version, like the
one below, would not,
3. Revised Counterfactual Test
I have been arguing that in line 1 (see below), the agent does not
intend to bring about a G as a means to an E; the G is a side effect of A-ing and
in line 2 the agent intends as her means an F&G. The problem with Bennett's
test question ("If you had believed that there would not be a G would you
have been less likely to A?") was that it could not pull these two types of cases
apart.
actual (a G occurs) counterfactual (no G)
line 1 A-> F&G-> H-> E A -> F-> H -> E
line 2 A -> F&G -> H -> E A -> F -> J-> E
But consider a revised test which will separate line 1 type cases from
line 2 type cases. The revised test involves appealing to two counterfactual
questions instead of one; the idea is that the test can be applied for any case
with two effects flowing from the action where the question is whether one of
these is intended. The questions (which refer to the chart above with line 1
and line 2) below provide a test for whether the agent intends to bring about a
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(Q1) If you had believed that as a result of your A-ing there would be
an F and a G but no H, would you have been less likely to A?
(Q2) If you had believed that as a result of your A-ing there would be
an F and a G but no H and no G, would you have been less likely to
A?
What will be important is whether the agent's responses to the two
questions differ. If the agent answers Yes to Q1 and No to Q2, this suggests
that there is preemption involved. However if the agent answers Yes to both
questions then this shows that she intends to bring about a G as a means (or
part of a means). If an agent answers No to both questions then she does not
intend to bring about a G as a meansThis test should work for any cases
which has the structure shown under the actual column above. To make this
clearer, I will return to HOUSEBUILDER and show how this strategy works
where Bennett's question did not.
Earlier I diagrammed HOUSEBUILDER as follows:
work every finish framing Frank sees Frank is
day for 6 moP- and facades facades happy
Marge's activity results in a finished frame and finished facades, But recall
that the case is like line 2 not line 1 because Marge supposes that if she were
not to finish the facades her end (Frank's being pleased) would come about in
a different way (via Frank's seeing the frame). And the problem I raised
earlier was that Bennett's test question could not distinguish whether
HOUSEBUILDER was like line 1 or line 2.
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The revised test involves comparing Marge's answers to the following two
questions:
(Q1) If you had believed that Frank would not see the facades, would you
have been less likely to undertake the project?
(Q2) If you had believed that Frank would not see the facades and that
the facades would not be done, would you have been less likely to
undertake the project?
Here the answer to (Q1) is Yes (since, remember, she believes the
facades will be completed and thus that it is seeing the facades which will
make him happy), And her answer to (Q2) is No. What's important is that
her answers to the two questions differ, If she had believed not only that he
wouldn't have seen the facades but additionally that she wouldn't have
finished them, then she would not have been less likely to work on the
house, since this leaves her believing that she finishes the frame and he sees
the frame. Again what is important is not her answer to either question in
isolation but the difference in the responses. The difference brings out that
she thinks in the absence of finishing the facades, her end would be brought
about by an alternate causal route. If she did not believe that finishing the
facades preempted an alternate route, then she would give the same response
to each of the questions.
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The revised test lacks simplicity; it's a burdensome test to use. Still, it,
or some other revised version of the counterfactual test strategy may succeed
at handling preemption.
4. Means-End Chains
The view I am pointing towards has agents intending each link in
what they take to be a causal chain from their means to their ends. It is
tempting simply to assert the following: If an agent believes that by A-ing she
will produce an F and she believes that the F will help to bring about her end,
E, then she intends to bring about an F as a means. 1 "Help to bring about" is
undesirably vague, but there is a more immediate problem with the view.
This is that it does not allow for cases where there are two separate routes to
an agent's end. For example, so far we have assumed that the deaths the
strategic bomber foresees he'll cause do not contribute to his end, only the
weakening of the armory contributes to his end. But now let's assume that he
sees he'll cause not civilian deaths, but deaths of enemy troops. He also sees
that this will help to accomplish his end of weakening the enemy. So by
dropping his bomb he believes he will bring about destruction of the armory
and the deaths of enemy troops and he believes both of these effects will
contribute to the weakening of the enemy. The case might be diagrammed as
follows:
1This turns out to be quite close to the view Bratman advocates.
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armory destroyed
bomb " enemy weakened
militarily
enemy troops die
Now assume additionally that the bomber intends to weaken the
enemy by destroying the armory. He foresees that enemy troops will die and
he knows that this effect will in fact contribute to his end, but it is not his
chosen means to his end. Furthermore, assume he believes that if the troops
were not to die, the armory destruction would weaken the enemy in the same
way as if they do die. So what we have is a case of two independent causal
routes to the bomber's end. It does seem to me quite plausible that the bomber
intends only the armory destruction as his means. That is why the view (in
italics above) won't do. Bratman suggests that agent's intend at least one
means-end chain. (For example, in the case above, if the bomber intends to
produce his end by bombing, he intends either the chain which brings about
his end via the deaths or the one that goes via the armory destruction, or
both; but he must intend at least one of these.)2 I think this is right, but let's
consider one final problem,
Consider a case which involves what might be called 'tracking'.
Imagine a slight variant on the strategic bomber case. The raid is to occur at
night. In order to find his target, the bomber will look for a hospital which is
right next to the armory, Why will he look for the hospital? Because it is well
lit at night. He will endeavor to drop his bomb over the lights of the hospital.
2 Presumably he might also intend that his end come up in one way or the
other.
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He will reason about finding the lights, since they are his only clue to finding
the armory. He may even use the destruction of the hospital as an indicator as
to whether he's been successful at hitting the armory. If, for example, after
dropping a bomb, he notices the lights are still on, he may fly back and drop
more bombs. Does he intend to destroy the hospital? On Bratman's account it
appears that he does. I'm not sure this is a problem for Bratman's account. It's
difficult to know what to say about such a case. Perhaps in such a case the
bomber does intend to hit the hospital, or to knock out the lights. But it is
worth noticing that he does not intend to do so as an end; his end is to hit the
armory. And, he does not intend to do so as a means. He does not believe that
the destruction of the hospital causes the destruction of the armory. He is
simply using the hospital's destruction as a guide to destroying the armory.
Hitting the hospital lights seems to be something like an epistemological
means; in any case, it's not a causal means. But perhaps some effects are
intended neither as (causal) means nor ends.
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Conclusion
My purpose in the thesis has been to argue against two challenges to
the Ordinary View, and thus to the Doctrine of Double Effect. The holistic
challenge put pressure on the scope of intentions from one direction--it
suggested that the scope of decisions, and likewise intentions, is broader than
we might ordinarily think. Bennett's challenge to the notion "intending as a
means" relied on pressure from the other direction on the scope of
intentions. He relied upon the claim that in delimiting the scope of
intentions, we must "shave things as closely as possible". I have argued that
both of these pressures can be blocked. We can block the pressure from the
holist camp by rejecting that decisions themselves are holistic. And we can
reject Bennett's challenge, in part because he relies on an overstrong test for
what is intended (one that picks up what an agent would intend), and in part
because he relies upon a faulty analogy between two key cases (TERROR
BOMBER and STRIKE).
I have also considered a replacement principle for DDE offered by
Warren Quinn as an attempt to get around Bennett's objection. I have
claimed that the replacement principle is also subject to Bennett's objection so
does not do what Quinn hoped it would do. However, I think the
replacement principle offers an interesting alternative to DDE. To decide
120
between them, one would need to take into account what sort of rationale
could be given for each, and that is something I have not addressed.
I have said very little by way of a positive account of what it is to intend
to bring about some effect as a means, versus to merely foresee it, (or to see it
as a side effect). Nor have I attempted to defend the Doctrine of Double Effect
itself. My aim has been simply to show that one kind of attack on the
Doctrine of Double Effect, namely the kind that impugns the distinction
between what we intend and what we foresee, fails.
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